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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1
 1 " ' . i '" .1 Appe Is err by disturbing *-he 
Distill 1 i»um*l " ;» finding of fact that petitioner established ,i 
prima facie case that Katherine Wentland Gorre i i i"i ' " ' m 
mone v I i " ' « di»tl( i d beaut) bex l\A lowing h* i deal h.' 
Inn the I our I of Appeals eii bv requiring 
petitioner t o ' nfroduce evidence <*t f he • m i - ^ i i i i, *>* , is 
wi II ' I I issession 1 \ Kathtfine Went J and 
Gorreli in establish a pi una iarie rase that Katherine 
Wentland Gorrell ownpd 1 he mmcv 
3, i " ' i M i ' ul Appeals improperly pla:t- the 
burden of proot on petit ioni-r? 
OPINION OF IHE (JUUK'l UF APPEALS 
" f" I i i i "I t, c i s i o n o f t h e C o n r t o I App e a 1 s i s reported a s 
Gorrell v. Gorrell, 740 J\ 2d 267 (lit ih App. 1987) 
GROUNDS 1UR JURISDICTION 
Juris. , , .to. of • •* > * invoked pursuant t ..ir 
Code \.. jh . 1" • *>(a) - decisie • • • 
wa^ ent*-1*^ 1 on J U I ^ z.7 :iv.,;, ,ug 
v netitione , -( appeals denied 
petitionei : etit . rehearing Lj ordti viaLeu September 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
•" First Security Bank of Urah, N A, i "Fi i 'U M M MI ii " ) „ 
as persona] i"pre';»n? H i 1 - I I hi I. .• * 1 .11 * i I I at ht-r i ne Wentland 
Gorrell, deceased, initiated this action to determine the 
ownership of $43,748.00 in cash found by Mrs. Gorrellfs husband 
following his wife's death. Mr. Gorrell found the money in a 
heart shaped beauty box that had been hidden in an agate blue 
roasting pan located in a kitchen cupboard in Mrs. Gorrell?s 
home. First Security claims that the money is an asset of the 
estate and should be distributed through the estate. Mr. 
Gorrell challenged First Security's claim that the money was 
the property of the estate. 
The District Court heard testimony from Mr. Gorrell 
and Normandy W. Johnson, Mrs. Gorrellfs daughter 
(R. 57-161). Based upon that record, the District Court 
found that the money was in the possession of Mrs. Gorrell at 
the time of her death and concluded that First Security had 
established a prima facie case that Mrs. Gorrell owned the 
money. (R. 161-62). Accordingly, consistent with Utah law, 
the District Court placed upon Mr. Gorrell the burden of 
proving his title to the money. (R. 162). The District Court 
found that on the evidence presented, Mr. Gorrell failed to 
carry his burden of proof. (R. 40, 163). The District Court, 
therefore, ruled that the money was an asset of the estate. 
(R. 41, 163). 
All citations herein are to the Record on Appeal as 
paginated by the Clerk of the District Court. 
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Mrs. Gorrell handled all of the business affairs of 
the family. (R. 80). Mr. Gorrell testified that Mrs. Gorrell 
was "very careful" with money, (R. 85), and that she 
"controlled" all the money. (R. 112-13). Mr. Gorrell also 
testified that Mrs. Gorrell kept cash around the house. (R. 
106). Mrs. Gorrell?s daughter confirmed that Mrs. Gorrell kept 
cash at home because of a fear of banks arising out of her 
experiences during the Depression. (R. 152). Mrs, Gorrellfs 
daughter also testified that Mrs. Gorrell purchased a new car 
in 1967 for $2,700.00 and paid a hospital bill of $1,200.00 
both with cash. (R. 159-60). 
The money at issue in this action was discovered by 
Mr. Gorrell in a heart shaped beauty box which had been hidden 
in a blue agate roasting pan. (R. 86-87). Mr. Gorrell had no 
knowledge of the existence of the money until he discovered 
it. (R. 39). Mr. Gorrell discovered the money while 
rearranging the kitchen cupboards on the day of Mrs. Gorrellfs 
death. (R. 86-87). During the marriage, Mr. Gorrell had never 
done any cooking. (R. 87). Only after Mrs. Gorrell died and 
Mr. Gorrell had to prepare his own meals did he have any 
contact with the household's cooking utensils. (R. 87). Mr. 
Gorrell testified he did not know where the money came from. 
(R. 88). Instead, he agreed that only Mrs. Gorrell knew the 
source of the money. (R. 88). 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS CONTRARY 
TO STANDARD OF REVIEW ADOPTED BY THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT. 
A. The Court Of Appeals Failed To Give Proper 
Deference To The District Court's Findings. 
"Hi "'H'rih Supreme Court has stated emphatically * 
appe l l a t e courts must a.fford great, d e f e r e n c e 1 ri * 1 
i ladings by a trial couri n n h \ s u 1 li I i i ,i I 
' In law or i+ findings aie clea: :v again^* 
weight -u evidence. Garcia v. Schwendi,ho;. 
^**
 l}U
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 ' -
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i HIii i- i in 1 it^ p o s s e s s i o n of t IHJ mone> fur1 that ml I he District 
Court. 
The Cour* . . ^  r *-
" i i i u i i ( i ! i J y . * c e d t h e * u : ^  i i r l . *'* : • . .
 IV 
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case of ownership." Id. The Court of Appeals1 analysis 
clearly demonstrates that it substituted its own assessment of 
the facts for that of the District Court. The Court of 
Appeals, however, did not find or rule that the District 
Court's findings were "clearly against the weight of the 
evidence" as required by Utah law. Thus, in reversing the 
District Court's judgment, the Court of Appeals failed to give 
proper deference to the District Court's factual findings. 
B. The District Court's Factual Findings Are 
Supported By The Evidence. 
The dispute between the parties concerns the ownership 
of the money found by Mr. Gorrell following his wife's death. 
If the money was owned by Mrs. Gorrell, it is an asset of her 
estate that must be distributed in accordance with the terms of 
her will. The Utah Supreme Court has held that once the 
representative of a decendentfs estate establishes prima facie 
evidence that the property was owned by the deceased at the 
time of death, the burden of proving title to the property 
shifts to the party asserting an adverse claim. Hall, 504 
P.2d at 996. A prima facie case of ownership of cash is 
established by proving possession of the cash. Gray's Harbor 
Lumber Co. v. Burton Lumber Co., 65 Utah 333, 236 P. 1102, 
1103 (1925). 
The District Court explicitly found that the money 
discovered by Mr. Gorrell was in Mrs. Gorrell's "possession and 
-6-
control" until the time of her death. (R. 161-62). This 
finding is amply supported by the evidence in the record. Mr. 
Gorrell had no knowledge of the money's existence prior to 
discovering it. (R. 39). Mr. Gorrell testified that Mrs. 
Gorrell handled the family's business affairs, (R. 80, 112-13), 
and was very careful with money. (R. 85). The money was found 
in a heart shaped beauty box which had been hidden in a blue 
agate roasting pan in a kitchen cupboard. (R. 87). Mr. 
Gorrell testified that he had done no cooking while his wife 
was living. (R. 87). He found the heart shaped beauty box on 
the day his wife died while rearranging the kitchen cupboards 
to make access easier for himself. (R. 86). All of these 
facts support the District Court's finding that the money was 
in the control and possession of Mrs. Gorrell up until the time 
of her death. The District Court's finding also is confirmed 
by the fact that the record contains absolutely no evidence 
that even so much as suggests that anyone other than Mrs. 
Gorrell had possession of the money up until Mr. Gorrell 
discovered it after his wife died. The record clearly 
establishes that the District Court's factual finding that the 
money was in the possession of Mrs. Gorrell at the time of her 
death is not contrary to the weight of the evidence. Moreover, 
under Utah law, proof of possession of cash constitutes prima 
facie evidence of ownership. Gray's Harbor, 236 P. at 1103. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the 
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District Court's finding that First Security had established a 
prima facie case that Mrs. Gorrell owned the money. Garcia, 
645 P.2d at 653; Hall, 504 P.2d at 996. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING IS CONTRARY 
TO UTAH LAW. 
As argued above, the District Court properly found 
that Mrs. Gorrell possessed the money up until the time of her 
death. In Utah, possession of cash or notes establishes a 
prima facie case of ownership. Grayys Harbor, 236 P.2d at 
1103; accord, In re Bickford, 74 111. App. 2d 190, 219 N.E.2d 
159, 162 (1966). The Bickford case illustrates the 
application of the possession rule in a factual context 
remarkably analogous to the facts present in this case. In 
Bickford, the estate sought to recover $2,507.00 in cash that 
was found by the respondent in the decedent's apron following 
her death. As here, the trial court found that the decedent 
possessed the money at the time of her death thereby creating a 
prima facie case of ownership by the decedent. The trial court 
further found that the respondent had not satisfied his burden 
of proving title to the money. On appeal, the Illinois 
Appellate Court affirmed, reasoning that 
Since we find possession to have been in decedent 
we must further find that Respondent did not meet 
his burden of proving ownership in himself . . . . 
219 N.E.2d at 162. 
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In this case, the Court of Appeals cited facts 
pertaining to the length of the Gorrell's marriage and the work 
histories of Mr. and Mrs. Gorrell in support of its conclusion 
that First Security had failed to make a prima facie showing 
that Mrs. Gorrell owned the money at the time of her death. 
740 P.2d at 270. In effect, the Court of Appeals required 
First Security to produce evidence of the source of the money, 
in addition to evidence of possession, to establish the prima 
facie case of ownership. In that respect, the Court of 
Appeals' ruling is contrary to the rule established by Gray's 
Harbor. Accord, Bickford, 219 N.E.2d at 162. 
To the extent that the Court of Appeals decision may 
be construed to be based on a finding that Mr. Gorrell 
contributed to the funds that were found in the heart shaped 
beauty box, the finding is not supported by the record. Mr. 
Gorrell admitted he did not know where the money in the heart 
shaped beauty box came from, but that only Mrs. Gorrell knew 
the source of that money. (R. 88). The record also contains 
ample evidence that Mrs. Gorrell brought substantial assets 
into the marriage, (R. 64), while Mr. Gorrell had nothing. (R. 
65). Mrs. Gorrell was very careful with money, (R. 85), and 
kept cash in her possession at least in part due to a distrust 
of banks resulting from the Depression. (R. 106, 152). Based 
on the evidence presented at trial, the District Court found 
that there was an equal likelihood that the source of the money 
-9-
was Mrs. Gorrell solely, or Mr. Gorrell solely or both Mr. and 
Mrs. Gorrell. (R. 162-63). The District Court concluded that 
"there is absolutely no way I can determine which of those, or 
which combination of those events occurred/' (R. 163). Since 
the District Court found that the source of the money had not 
been established by the evidence, the only basis for 
determining ownership is possession, which the District Court 
found in favor of Mrs. Gorrell. 
III. RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE BY THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT IS IMPORTANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
UTAH LAW. 
This case presents the important issue of how claims 
of ownership of personal property, especially cash, are to be 
resolved in probate proceedings. The need for a clear test for 
resolving such disputes is particularly important because the 
best source of evidence, testimony from the decedent, is not 
available. The decision of the Court of Appeals undermines the 
certainty of prior Utah case law which holds that possession of 
cash establishes a prima facie case of ownership, see, e.g., 
Gray's Harbor, and that once a prima facie case of ownership 
is established by an estate's personal representative the 
opposing claimant bears the burden of proving title to the 
property. See, e.g., Hall. The Court of Appeals1 decision 
fails to follow this precedent by requiring proof of the source 
of the property in addition to proof of possession to establish 
a prima facie case of ownership. As this case illustrates, the 
-10-
additional proof required by the Court of Appeals often will 
not be available because the sole competent witness is the 
decedent. The Court of Appeals1 rule is impractical and it 
should be rejected in favor of the rule established by Gray's 
Harbor, Hall and Bickford. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner First Security Bank, as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Katherine Wentland Gorrell 
seeks a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The writ 
of certiorari is appropriate and necessary in this case because 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is not consistent with 
prior rulings of this Court, because the Court of Appeals 
improperly substituted its assessment of the facts for the 
findings of the District Court and because the case presents an 
opportunity for this Court to settle an important issue of Utah 
law. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 1987. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Michael J. Glasmann 
David L. Deisley 
Attorneys for Petitioner, First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. 
-11-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 13th day of 
October, 1987, to the following: 
Pete N. Vlahos, Esq. 
Vlahos & Sharp 
2456 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorny for Respondent, 
Robert E. Gorrell 
5- ^^^Q^-^ 
4866D 
12-
Tab A 
ESTATE OF GOR 
Cite as 740 P.2d 2 
though she did not have to rule out all 
other possible non-negligent causes, she did 
have to offer evidence showing that the 
balance of probabilities weighed in favor of 
negligence. Id. See also Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 248 
(W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984). 
[3] In order to create a genuine factual 
dispute on this point, Robinson thus had to 
come forward with evidence to counter Dr. 
Burke's affidavit opinion—that non-negli-
gent causes of her infection were proba-
ble—with expert testimony to the effect 
that Robinson's infection most likely result-
ed from negligence, assuming it was possi-
ble to find an expert who could and would 
make such a statement.1 The depositions 
of respondents' doctors relied upon by ap-
pellant simply do not do the job. They 
provide no evidence that Robinson's infec-
tion was most likely caused by negligence, 
notwithstanding what the doctors might 
have believed on March 21,1982, before the 
laboratory test results were received. 
Since appellant did not submit evidence cre-
ating a genuine issue of fact about the 
most likely cause of her injuries, the trial 
judge properly proceeded to conclude that 
respondents were entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
We agree that trial courts should be ex-
tremely cautious in granting summary 
judgment for a defendant on the basis that 
plaintiff has failed to secure expert testi-
mony to support a medical negligence ac-
tion. Ckiero v. Chicago Osteopathic 
Hosp., 74 Ill.App.3d at 176, 29 Ill.Dec. at 
654, 392 N.E.2d at 211. But appellant con-
tends that a plaintiff suing on a theory of 
res ipsa loquitur is always entitled to a trial 
on the merits, so that summary judgment 
is always inappropriate. Such an argu-
ment miscomprehends the purpose and ap-
plication of the doctrine, as well as the 
pretrial responsibilities of a plaintiff faced 
with a summary judgment motion. In this 
regard, we concur in the reasoning of the 
appellate court quoted in Chiero: 
We agree that if there is any sound basis 
to do so, a trial court should reject sum-
3LL v. GORRELL Utah 267 
(UtahApp 1987) 
mary judgment in this type of case. 
Where, however, the record indicates 
that plaintiff has [had] every opportunity 
to establish his case and has failed to 
demonstrate that he could show negli-
gent acts or omissions . . . [on the part of 
the] defendant by expert medical testimo-
ny, where the issue is clearly one which 
cannot be determined by laymen alone, 
summary judgment could be allowed. 
Chiero v. Chicago Osteopathic Hosp., 74 
Ill.App.3d at 177, 29 Ill.Dec. at 654, 392 
N.E.2d at 211 (quoting Hill v. Durkin, 58 
Ill.App.3d 1003, 1008, 16 Ill.Dec. 372, 376, 
374 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (1978)). 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. Costs to respondents. 
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
In the Matter of the ESTATE, OF Kath-
erine Wentland GORRELL, Deceased, 
v. 
Robert E. GORRELL, Appellant 
No. 860113-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 27, 1987. 
The Second District Court, Weber 
County, David Roth, J., found cash asset to 
be solely asset of wife's estate, and hus-
band appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Bench, J., held that representative of estate 
failed to establish prima facie case of own-
ership of cash found hidden in box by evi-
dence that wife owned home in which cou-
ple lived and that husband had no prior 
knowledge of hidden cash, where husband 
lived with wife in home for over 22 years, 
1. We give no credence to appellant's claim that supporting her negligence action without the 
she was unable to obtain an expert opinion discarded needles. 
268 Utah 740 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
and husband made significant financial con-
tributions to marriage. 
Reversed. 
The bank filed a petition with the Sec 
Judicial District Court of Weber Count 
recover the money as solely an asse 
decedent's estate. Concurrent with the 
tition, the bank placed a freeze on aj 
lant's account. By the time the acc< 
was frozen, only about $5,000.00 remai 
After a hearing on August 9, 1984, the 
court issued an order restraining appel 
from disposing of any of decedent's as 
currently in his possession. The court 
for trial the matter of proper ownershi 
the cash. 
Trial was held February 5, 1985. A\ 
lant and decedent's daughter from a p 
marriage testified concerning the ean 
capacity and financial background of aj 
lant and decedent. The court placed 
burden on appellant of proving owner 
of the money and found three poss 
sources of the money: 1) solely appella 
assets, 2) the combined assets of appel 
and decedent, or 3) solely decedent's ass 
The court held appellant failed to prove 
cash was comprised in whole or in par 
money contributed by him, and, therei 
entered judgment for the bank. The c 
ordered appellant immediately to turn < 
the unused portion of the money and nc 
dispose of any of the assets purchased i 
the discovered money. 
On appeal, appellant argues the coi 
finding of ownership was clearly aga 
the weight of the evidence and the c 
erred in placing the burden of prool 
him. Similar arguments, were made 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. h 
29 Utah 2d 24, 504 P.2d 995 (1972) an 
In re Estate ofBickford, 74 Ill.App.2d 
219 N.E.2d 159 (1966). 
In Hall, plaintiff bank, administrate 
defendant's parents' estates, initiate 
proceeding against defendant to rec< 
proceeds from the sale of stock certific 
in defendant's possession allegedly bel< 
ing to one or the other of the este 
During his lifetime, defendant's fa 
owned stock certificates representing 
proximately 5,500 shares in a mining c 
pany. Defendant claimed her father n 
a gift of the certificates to her mot 
who, in turn, made a gift of them to 
Executors and Administrators <s=>85(5y4) 
Evidence that wife owned home in 
which couple lived and that husband had no 
prior knowledge of hidden cash did not 
establish prima facie case of ownership of 
cash discovered by husband in box hidden 
in roasting pan, and husband thus did not 
have burden of proving ownership of cash, 
where husband and wife lived together in 
home for 22 years, wife worked for only 
three or four years after marriage and 
then retired, and husband made significant 
financial contributions to marriage. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, Ogden, 
for appellant. 
Michael J. Glasmann, Ogden, for respon-
dent 
OPINION 
Before GARFF, BENCH and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Appellant Robert E. Gorrell challenges 
the judgment of a trial court finding a cash 
asset to be solely an asset of his decedent-
wife's estate. We reverse. 
Katherine Wentland Gorrell, appellant's 
wife, passed away May 4, 1984 at the age 
of 80 and after over 22 years of marriage 
to appellant Later that day, while rear-
ranging cupboards in the kitchen, appellant 
discovered a heartshaped beauty box hid-
den in a roasting pan. Inside the beauty 
box he found approximately $43,700.00 in 
mostly small bills. Prior to this discovery, 
appellant had no knowledge of the exist-
ence of this money. 
Appellant contacted the local branch of 
First Security Bank of Utah, the personal 
representative of his wife's estate, and in-
formed the bank of his discovery. He later 
deposited the money in his account at the 
same bank. 
ESTATE OF GORRELL v. GORRELL 
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fendant. In 1969, the market value of the 
stock increased significantly. Defendant 
effected a transfer of the shares on the 
books of the corporation by supplying a 
bond and thereafter sold the shares. At 
trial, the sole issue was whether or not 
defendant had acquired ownership of the 
shares of stock by way of gift. Evidence 
at trial showed defendant's father did not 
sign the assignment and transfer contained 
on the reverse side of each stock certifi-
cate. Furthermore, the certificates re-
mained in the name of defendant's father 
on the records of the corporation during 
both parents' lifetimes. The trial court 
concluded defendant had failed to prove a 
gift by clear and convincing evidence, and 
entered judgment for plaintiff. On appeal 
defendant argued the trial court erred in 
imposing the burden of proof of ownership 
on her. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court and held defendant had the 
burden of proving ownership, in view of 
the name on the stock certificates and the 
absence of transfer endorsements. Hall, 
504 P.2d at 996. From that holding, it is 
apparent that once plaintiff had made a 
prima facie case of ownership, the burden 
of proof shifted to defendant. 
The mechanics of this standard were 
more clearly articulated in the Bickford 
case. In Bickford, the administratrix of 
decedent's estate initiated a proceeding 
against respondent, decedent's son, to re-
cover certain assets in respondent's posses-
sion allegedly belonging to the estate. One 
of the contested assets was $2,507.00 in 
cash discovered, after decedent's death, in 
the pocket of her dress located in a store-
room of her house. At trial, witnesses for 
petitioner-administratrix testified decedent 
owned the home in which she lived. She 
had operated a restaurant for twelve years 
prior to her death but, due to ill health, was 
hospitalized for the three months immedi-
ately preceding. Decedent kept all her re-
ceipts and business papers in the store-
room. Respondent testified he lived with 
decedent most of his life including the peri-
od of his marriage. He helped his mother 
in the restaurant which, he testified, was 
unprofitable for some time prior to her 
death. Respondent claimed the money con-
sisted of gifts from his father and grandfa-
ther which he had delivered to his mother 
for safekeeping. Respondent had not been 
employed regularly for eight years. 
The trial court entered judgment for peti-
tioner and respondent appealed. The Ap-
pellate Court of Illinois held, "The burden 
of persuasion remains with petitioner but 
when petitioner has presented a prima facie 
case of ownership by the decedent the bur-
den of establishing ownership in himself 
shifts to respondent." 219 N.E.2d at 161. 
In affirming the trial court for failure of 
respondent to sustain his burden of proof, 
the Appellate Court went on to establish 
criteria for assessing what constitutes a 
prima facie case of ownership. The Court 
held as follows: 
The evidence shows clearly that the mon-
ey involved was in the pocket of a dress 
owned by decedent and in her control 
until the time of her removal to the hos-
pital. There is no evidence showing any 
change in control at that time or from 
that time to the date of death. In our 
opinion, this establishes the element of 
possession in decedent at the time of 
death rather than in Respondent and 
when considered with the other evi-
dence amply presents a prima facie 
case of ownership of such money by 
decedent This being the case, the bur-
den was on Respondent to show by what 
right he claimed ownership. The facts 
which Respondent claims support his 
ownership of the money are disputed in 
practically every material respect 
Id. (Emphasis added.) The "other evi-
dence" which amply presented a prima fa-
cie case of ownership of the cash in that 
case included decedent's exclusive owner-
ship of the dress in which the cash was 
found, decedent's income through her own 
business, and the absence of contributions 
to household income by respondent 
In the instant case, the trial court incor-
rectly placed the burden of proof on appel-
lant since the bank failed to establish a 
prima facie case of ownership. The bank 
established only that decedent owned the 
home in which the couple lived and that 
appellant had no prior knowledge of the 
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hidden cash. No liother evidence" suffc 
cient to establish a prima facie case of 
ownership was presented. On the con-
trary, appellant and decedent lived togeth-
er in decedent's home for over 22 years. 
There was also no evidence the roasting 
pan in which the money was found was 
owned exclusively by decedent. Decedent 
worked for only three to four years after 
the marriage and then retired, receiving 
approximately $225.00 per month in social 
security. Appellant, however, made signif-
icant financial contributions to the mar-
riage. He worked full time for most of the 
marriage and delivered all of his income to 
decedent who handled the family finances. 
Under those circumstances, there being no 
prima facie case of ownership by the bank, 
it was error for the court to impose on 
appellant the burden of proving ownership 
of the cash. 
We therefore reverse the judgment be-
low. Costs to appellant 
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
Ben K. HOOPIIAINA, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
• . 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, 
dba, LDS Hospital, and Jane Doe, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 86007&-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 27, 1987. 
Medical malpractice action was 
brought against hospital and hospital 
moved for summary judgment The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E, 
Conder, J., granted hospital summary judg-
ment and appeal was taken. The Court ot 
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that in ab-
sence of expert to testify for plaintiff that 
quinidine mistakenly administered to him 
harmed him, there was no evidence upon 
which finding of liability against hospital 
could lie. 
Affirmed. 
1. Hospitals «=>8 
In medical malpractice actions, plain-
tiff must provide expert testimony to estab-
lish standard of care, hospital's failure to 
comply with that standard, that hospital 
caused plaintiffs injury, and any issues of 
fact which are outside knowledge and expe-
rience of lay persons. 
2. Hospitals e»8 
Inasmuch as hospital admitted that its 
employee mistakenly administered single 
20b-mi))igram tablet of quinidine to plain-
tiff, hospital's breach of standard of care 
was admitted without requiring expert tes-
timony, so that only issues remaining for 
jury were whether injury existed and 
whether quinidine caused plaintiffs injury. 
3. Hospitals e=>8 
In absence of expert to testify for 
plaintiff that quinidine mistakenly adminis-
tered to plaintiff by hospital employee 
harmed plaintiff, or that more than single 
200-milligram tablet was administered, 
plaintiff could not prove injury existed or 
that quinidine caused injury, for purpose of 
maintaining medical malpractice action 
against hospital. 
4. Pretrial Procedure «=>40 
Trial court did not err in denying medi-
cal malpractice plaintiffs motion to compel 
hospital to provide answers to interrogato-
ries concerning name and address of pa-
tient who should have received quinidine 
mistakenly administered to plaintiff, under 
State Department of Health, Hospital and 
Psychiatric Hospital Rules and Regula-
tions, requiring confidentiality of patient 
information. U.OA.1953, 78-25-25. 
Matt Biljanic, Midvale, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
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In the matter of the Estate of 
Katherine Wentland Gorrell, 
Deceased, 
v. 
Robert E. Gorrell, 
Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 860113-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Respondent's 
Petition for Rehearing in the abbve captioned matter, and the Court 
having duly considered said petition, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's Petition for 
Rehearing be denied. 
Dated this 10th day of September, 1987. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING by depositing the 
same in the United States mail# postage prepaid to the following: 
Pete N. Vlahos 
Vlahos & Sharp 
Attorney at Law 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Michael J. Glasmann 
Attorney at Law 
1000 First Security Bldg. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
DATED thislOth day of September, 1987, 
Karen Bean 
Case Management Clerk 
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Amado B. GARCIA, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief of Driv-
ers License Division, State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 17559. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 1, 1982. 
Motorist appealed from an order of the 
Second District Court, Davis County, Doug-
las L. Cornaby, J., affirming the Depart-
ment of Public Safety's administrative rev-
ocation of his driving privileges under the 
implied consent statute. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that where the 
motorist occupied the driver's position be*-
hind the steering wheel of an automobile, 
with possession of the ignition key and with 
the apparent ability to start and move the 
vehicle, he had "actual physical control" 
under the implied consent statute, even 
though he might have been prevented from 
moving the vehicle by a fence in front and a 
parked car in the rear. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles &=>1U2(9, 10) 
Showing that arresting officer had 
grounds to believe that person was in physi-
cal control of vehicle is not by itself suffi-
cient to support administrative license revo-
cation for refusal to submit to blood test, 
but Department of Public Safety must 
show that operator was in actual physical 
control of motor vehicle in addition to show-
ing that arresting officer had grounds to 
believe that operator was then under influ-
ence of alcohol; same burdens must be met 
in district court de novo review. U.C.A. 
1953, 41-6-44.10(b). 
2. Automobiles <s=>144.2(10) 
In contrast to prosecutions under crimi-
nal statutes, driver's license revocation pro-
ceeding requires proof only by preponder-
GARCIA v. SCHWENDIMAN Utah 651 
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ance of evidence and not beyond reasonable 
doubt. U.C.A.1953, 41-6^4 10(b) 
3. Appeal and Error <s=> 1009(1, 4) 
Standard for appellate review of factu-
al findings affords great deference to trial 
court's view of evidence unless trial court 
has misapplied law or its findings are clear-
ly against weight of evidence. 
4. Automobiles <s=» 144.1(1) 
"Actual physical control" language of 
implied consent statute should be read as 
intending to prevent intoxicated drivers 
from entering their vehicles except as pas-
sengers or passive occupants. U.C.A.1953, 
41-4-44.10(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Automobiles <s=» 144.1(1) 
Where motorist occupied driver's posi-
tion behind steering wheel of automobile, 
with possession of ignition key and with 
apparent ability to start and move vehicle, 
he had "actual physical control" under im-
plied consent statute, even though he might 
have been prevented from moving vehicle 
by fence in front and parked caHn rear. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-&-44.10(a). 
6. Automobiles <&=» 144.1(1) 
Fact that motorist occupying driver's 
position in automobile might be physically 
obstructed from driving away does not pre-
clude license revocation under implied con-
sent statute. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(a). 
7. Automobiles <$=> 144.2(9) 
To obtain license revocation under im-
plied consent statute^ Department of Public 
Safety need not show that motorist actually 
intended to exert "actual physical control" 
over vehicle. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(a). 
Richard W. Brann, Ogden, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M. 
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
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DURHAM, Justice: 
After a trial de novo, the district court 
affirmed the defendant's administrative 
revocation of plaintiff Garcia's driving priv-
ileges. Plaintiff appeals from the district 
court decision and contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the district 
court's finding that he was in "actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle" as contem-
plated by the Utah implied consent statute. 
At 6:00 p. m. on November 1, 1980, Offi-
cer Gerald Ecker responded to a distur-
bance complaint at an apartment complex 
in Sunset, Utah. When he arrived at the 
complex, Officer Ecker was met by a Mr. 
Varble, who had positioned his own vehicle 
behind the automobile of the plaintiff to 
prevent the plaintiff from backing out of 
his parking stall. A fence was located ap-
proximately three feet in front of the plain-
tiffs car. Officer Ecker testified that as he 
approached the Garcia vehicle, he observed 
the plaintiff alone in the vehicle behind the 
steering wheel in the "process of starting 
his motor vehicle" by attempting to turn on 
the ignition; the officer testified that he 
saw the keys in the ignition. While there 
was some dispute about whether or not the 
key was actually in the ignition, the district 
court found it "believable that the plaintiff 
had the keys in the ignition," and it is not 
disputed that he had the ignition key in his 
exclusive possession. Officer Ecker ob-
served that plaintiff was apparently under 
the influence of alcohol. A second police 
officer, Officer Gale, arrived at the scene, 
obtained the keys from the plaintiff and, 
after interviewing Officer Ecker and Mr. 
Varble, placed the plaintiff under arrest for 
being in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol. 
The plaintiff refused to permit chemical 
tests of his blood or breath, and consequent-
ly received a one-year revocation of his 
driver's license after an administrative 
hearing by the Department of Public Safety 
pursuant to the authority of the Utah im-
plied consent statute, § 41-6-44.10, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953). This statute provides for 
revocation of a person's driver's license 
when he refuses to submit to chemical tests 
of his blood, breath or urine "for the pur-
pose of determining whether he was driving 
or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alco-
hol." The statute's enforcement provision, 
§ 41-£-44.10(b) U.C.A., requires that the 
arresting officer have reasonable grounds 
to believe that the arrested person has been 
driving or is in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol. 
[1] The defendant argues that a show-
ing that the arresting officer had grounds 
to believe the person was in physical control 
of a vehicle is by itself sufficient to support 
an administrative license revocation. We 
disagree. This Court has previously recog-
nized two separate evidentiary burdens to 
be borne by the Department of Public Safe-
ty in a revocation proceeding. The depart-
ment must show that an operator was "in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle" 
in addition to showing that the arresting 
officer had grounds to believe that the op-
erator was then under the influence of alco-
hol. Ballard v. State, Utah, 595 P.2d 1302 
(1979). 
[2] The same burdens must be met in 
the district court. The district court's juris-
diction, conferred by § 41-6-44.10(b) 
U.C.A., is limited to a trial de novo "to 
determine whether the petitioner's license is 
subject to revocation under the provisions 
of this act." In Ballard, supra, we charac-
terized the trial de novo as "civil and ad-
ministrative, the purpose of which is for the 
protection of the public." 595 P.2d at 1304. 
In contrast to prosecutions under criminal 
statutes, a license revocation proceeding re-
quires proof only by a preponderance of the 
evidence and not beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Since all other matters were re-
solved by stipulation, the single issue before 
the district court, and now before us, is 
whether the defendant proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the plaintiff 
was "in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle" as contemplated by the implied 
consent statute. 
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[3] The district court found "from the 321 P.2d at 618, 
totality of the facts and the circumstances 
that the [plaintiff] had actual physical con-
trol of the vehicle as required by the Im-
plied Consent Statute." The standard for 
appellate review of factual findings affords 
great deference to the trial court's view of 
the evidence unless the trial court has mis-
applied the law or its findings are clearly 
against the weight of the evidence. Paga-
n0 v. Walker, Utah, 639 P.2d 452 (1975); 
Reed v. Alvey, Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980). 
The meaning of "actual physical control" 
is suggested by the structure of § 41-G-44.-
10(a), which reads: 
Any person operating a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given 
his consent to a chemical test or tests . . . 
for the purpose of determining whether 
he was driving or in actual physical con-
trol of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol . . . . [Emphasis 
added.] 
The use of the disjunctive "or" strongly 
suggests an intent to proscribe conduct be-
yond and different from driving or operat-
ing a moving vehicle.1 Thus, the standard 
in Utah for determining whether a person 
was "in actual physical control" of a vehicle 
is different from the standard used in 
states which have only "driving" or "oper-
ating" language in their statutes. State v. 
Duly, 64 N.J. 122, 313 A.2d 194 (1973), for 
example, relied upon by plaintiff, was de-
cided under a criminal statute with "operat-
ing" language and is not persuasive in this 
case. Of greater value is the case of State 
v. Ruona, Mont., 321 P.2d 615 (1958), in 
which the Montana Supreme Court, follow-
ing an earlier Ohio case, construed a crimi-
nal statute with the phrase "drive or be in 
actual physical control," and adopted the 
view that: 
the statute defined two distinct of-
fenses, in "operating a vehicle," and "be-
ing in actual physical control of a vehicle" 
while intoxicated. 
Utah 653 
This conclusion was like-
wise reached in Walker v. State, Okl.Cr., 
424 P.2d 1001 (1967), where the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the use 
of the disjunctive in Oklahoma's statute 
resulted in two offenses, one being "to 
drive or operate" and the other being "to be 
in actual physical control" of a motor vehi-
cle. The language of Utah's implied con-
sent statute requires the same construction. 
A definition of "actual physical control" 
is contained in State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 
404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971). The statute in 
question there was § 41-6-44, which made 
it unlawful for any person under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor "to drive or be in 
actual physical control of any vehicle within 
this state." In Bugger, the defendant was 
found asleep in his car, which was complete-
ly off the traveled portion of the highway; 
the motor was not running. This Court 
held that there was no afctual physical con-
trol of the vehicle. "Actual physical con-
trol" was defined in its ordinary sense to 
mean "present bodily restraint, directing 
influence, domination or regulation." 483 
P.2d at 443. The Court found, on these 
facts, that the defendant was "not control-
ling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any 
dominion over it." Id. 
*• As of 1967, § 41-6-44.10(a) U.C.A. simply 
stated that "any person operating a motor vehi-
was deemed to have given his consent to cle" 
chemical tests. In 1969, a new subparagraph 
(b) was enacted which referred to tests "for the 
purpose of determining whether he was driving 
Acts short of starting the motor have 
been held to constitute actual physical con-
trol in other jurisdictions. In Hughes v. 
State, Okl.Cr., 535 P.2d 1023 (1975), the 
court found a defendant to have been in 
actual physical control of a vehicle when 
the vehicle was found improperly parked in 
a residential area. The defendant was in 
the front seat, the ignition key was in the 
ignition, and the motor was turned off. 
The court said: 
It is our opinion that the legislature, in 
making it a crime to be in "actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor," in-
or was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle under the influence ...," which is the 
same language found in the current statute. 
Thus, the Legislature appears to have deliber-
ately expanded the scope of the statute's cover-
age. 
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tended to enable the drunken driver to be 
apprehended before he strikes . . . . 
* * * * * * 
We believe that an intoxicated person 
seated behind the steering wheel of a 
motor vehicle is a threat to the safety 
and welfare of the public. The danger is 
less than when the intoxicated person is 
actually driving a vehicle, but it does 
exist. The defendant when arrested may 
have been exercising no conscious volition 
with regard to the vehicle, still there is a 
legitimate inference to be drawn that he 
placed himself behind the wheel of the 
vehicle and could have at any time start-
ed the automobile and driven away. 
535 P.2d at 1024. The same public policy 
concern for prevention compelled a similar 
result in City of Cincinnati v. Kelley, 47 
Ohio St.2d 94,1 Ohio Ops. 56, 351 N.E.2d 85 
(1976). In that case an intoxicated motorist 
seated in the driver's seat of a legally 
parked car with his hands on the steering 
wheel and the keys in the ignition was 
found to be in actual physical control of his 
vehicle, even though the engine was off. 
The court held that the relevant city ordi-
nance provided for two separate offenses, in 
that it prohibited "operating or being in 
'actual physical control' of a vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol." (Emphasis 
in original.) From that initial premise, the 
court concluded that it should interpret the 
"control" offense in light of the apparent 
legislative purpose in defining an offense 
separate from "operating." 
The clear purpose of the control aspect of 
the instant ordinance is to deter persons 
from being found under circumstances in 
which they can directly commence operat-
ing a vehicle while they are under the 
influence of alcohol . . . . 
* * * * * * 
2. See, e.g., State v. Ghylin% N.D., 250 N.W.2d 
252 (1977) (purpose of statute to deter intoxi-
cated persons from getting into their vehicle 
except as passengers); State v. Beckey, 291 
Minn. 483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971) (purpose of 
implied consent law to aid enforcement of 
criminal drunk driving statute); State v. Hal-
vorson, Minn., 181 N.W.2d 473 (1970) (purpose 
to promote traffic safety); State v. Schuler, 
N.D., 243 N.W.2d 367 (1976) (purpose of "actu-
al physical control** statute is preventive). 
(T]he term "actual physical control," <a 
employed in the subject ordinance, i 3 
quires that a person be in the driver! 
seat of a vehicle, behind the steering 
wheel, in possession of the ignition keyl 
and in such condition that he is physicallw 
capable of starting the engine jtnJ. 
causing the vehicle to move. 
351 N.E.2d at 87. That a preventive pur] 
pose should be read into the "actual physil 
cal control" language is the opinion of & 
substantial majority of the jurisdictions in! 
terpreting similar statutory language.2 
In a recent case, State v. Juncewskjl 
Minn., 308 N.W.2d 316 (1981), the Supremj 
Court of Minnesota held that a defendant 
who had been found inside a pickup truck! 
seated behind and leaning against the steer! 
ing wheel was in "actual physical control]] 
of the vehicle. While there was uncertain^ 
ty as to whether the motor was running! 
the court held that "[w]hether a motor! 
must be running before a person may be1^ 
actual physical control is essentially a poliqfi 
issue." 308 N.W.2d at 320. j | | 
[4,5] As a matter of public policy ana 
statutory construction, we believe that $i 
"actual physical control" language ^pt 
Utah's implied consent statute should |»J 
read as intending to prevent intoxicated, 
drivers from entering their vehicles except 
as passengers or passive occupants as in 
Bugger, supra. Therefore, under the facts 
before us, where a motorist occupied the 
driver's position behind the steering wheeV 
with possession of the ignition key and with 
the apparent ability to start and move the 
vehicle,3 we hold that there has been in 
adequate showing of "actual physical cbh-
trol" under our implied consent statute/ ' j 
3. The testimony of Officer Ecker was that 
plaintiff had the key in the ignition and 4<was to 
the process of starting his motor vehicle." He 
later expressed the view that the plaintiff was 
having trouble doing so because of the degree 
of his intoxication, but nothing in the record 
warrants a finding that the plaintiff was physi-
cally unable to start the car, as would be the 
case with an unconscious or sleeping motorist 
WILSON v. 
Cite as, Utah, 
[6] That the plaintiff might have been 
revented from moving his vehicle by the 
>nce in front and the parked car of Mr. 
arble in the rear does not alter our conclu-
on. In that respect, our decision comports 
ith cases from other jurisdictions in which 
iere was a physical obstacle preventing 
tual movement of the vehicle, but the 
urts nonetheless found actual physical 
ntrol.4 The record in this case demon-
rates that plaintiff's automobile could 
ve traveled at least a few feet if it had 
en put into operation. 
[7] Similarly, we find it unnecessary for 
e department to show actual intent under 
e control provisions of the implied consent 
ttute. Just as an intent to drive is in-
red from one's actual driving, so also 
ty an intent to control a vehicle be in-
Ted from the performance of those acts 
ich we have held to constitute actual 
ysical control. 
The decision of the district court is af-
Tied. 
IALL, C. J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
WE, JJ., concur. 
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submit a rezoning ordinance to a referen-
dum. The Second District Court, Davis 
County, Thornley K. Swan, J., denied the 
petition, and appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court held that an unsigned minute 
entry did not constitute an entry of judg-
ment, nor was it final judgment for pur-
poses of applicable rules governing appeals. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Appeal and Error <s=>78(l) 
An unsigned minute entry denying pe-
tition for writ of mandamus did not consti-
tute an entry of judgment, nor was it final 
judgment for purposes of applicable rules 
governing appeals. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 
58A(b, c), 72(a). 
?ord WILSON and Marilee W. Wilson, 
et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
n B. MANNING, City Recorder, City 
of Fruit Heights, Defendant and 
Respondent 
No. 17632. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 1, 1982. 
Petitioners brought action for a writ of 
iamus commanding a city recorder to 
?e, e g., State v. Dunbany, 184 Neb. 337, 167 
.^2d 556 (1969), State v. Schuler, N.D., 243 
Curtis J. Drake, Salt Lake pity, for plain-
tiffs and appellants. 
D. Kent Norton, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
Petitioners brought this action for a writ 
of mandamus commanding a city recorder 
to submit a rezoning ordinance to a referen-
dum. The district court denied the petition 
in an unsigned minute entry accompanied 
by a certificate of mailing which directed 
counsel for the defendant to prepare an 
order conforming to the minute entry. 
However, no order appears in the record 
and apparently none was entered. The no-
tice of appeal states that petitioners appeal 
"from the minute entry entered in this ac-
tion . . . ." 
An unsigned minute entry does not con-
stitute an entry of judgment, nor is it a 
final judgment for purposes of Utah 
R.Civ.P. 72(a). Utah R.Civ.P. 58A(b) and 
(c); Steadman v. Lake Hills, 20 Utah 2d 61, 
433 P.2d 1 (1967); Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 
N.W.2d 367 (1976). 
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F |RST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N. A., 
as administrator of the Estates of George 
Hatton Buckley and Pearl Murdock Buck-
ley, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Lucille Buckley HALL and Harold E. Hall, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 12837. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Dee. 28, 1972. 
Action by administrator of estates of 
deceased father and mother to recover from 
daughter certain stock certificates or pro-
ceeds from sale thereof. The Fourth Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, 
J., entered judgment for plaintiff and de-
fendants appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Tuckett, J., held that daughter, who had 
effected transfer of shares on books of 
corporation by supplying bond, had burden 
of showing that the shares, which had 
been carried on books of corporation in 
name of father who had not executed stock 
transfer endorsements, had been given by 
father to mother and later by mother to 
daughter. 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Gifts €=>47(l) 
In action by administrator of estates 
of deceased father and mother to recover 
from daughter stock certificates or pro-
ceeds from sale thereof, daughter, who had 
effected transfer of shares on books of 
corporation by supplying bond, had burden 
of showing that the shares, which had 
been carried on books of corporation in 
name of father who had not executed stock 
transfer endorsements, had been given by 
father to mother and later by mother to 
daughter. 
2. Appeal and Error <£=>I008.I(I), 1012.1(4) 
The Supreme Court will not disturb 
findings of trial court unless court has mis-
applied proven facts or made findings 
clearly against weight of the evidence. 
OP UTAH, N. A. v. HALL Utah 9 9 5 
P.2d 995 
3. Executors and Administrators C=^ 59 
Gifts <§=>49(6) 
In action by administrator of estates of 
deceased father and mother to recover from 
daughter stock certificates, or proceeds 
from sale thereof, which administrator 
claimed to be assets of one or other of the 
estates, wherein daughter claimed that, aft-
er death of father, de facto distribution 
of his estate was made by mother and chil-
dren, that mother had accepted the certifi-
cates as part of her share of estate and sub-
sequently gave them to daughter, e\ idence 
was insufficient to show that mother had 
received the shares as part of that de facto 
distribution. 
J. Rulon Morgan, Frank J. Allen, Clyde, 
Mecham & Pratt, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants-appellants. 
Glen J. Ellis, Maxfield, Gammon, Ellis 
& McGuire, Provo, for plaintiff-respond-
ent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The plaintiff as administrator initiated 
these proceedings in the court below seek-
ing to recover from the defendant Lucille 
Buckley Hall certain stock certificates or 
the proceeds from the sale thereof which 
it claims to be assets of one or other of 
the estates being administered upon. The 
defendant Lucille Buckley Hall claimed 
ownership of the shares by an inter vivos 
gift from her mother Pearl Murdock Buck-
ley. During his lifetime George Hatton 
Buckley owned certain stock certificates 
representing approximately 5500 shares of 
stock in the Mercur Dome Gold Mining 
Company. The defendant Lucille Buckley 
Hall claims that prior to his death her 
father George Hatton Buckley made a gift 
of the stock certificates to her mother 
Pearl Murdock Buckley who thereafter 
kept the certificates in a black box which 
also contained other papers and records. 
The decedent George Hatton Buckley did 
not sign the assignment and transfer con-
tained on the reverse side of each stock cer-
tificate and the certificates remained in the 
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name of George Hatton Buckley on the rec-
ords of the corporation during the lifetimes 
of George Hatton Buckley and his wife 
Pearl Murdock Buckley. During the year 
1969 the market value of the stock in ques-
tion increased sharply and the defendant 
who had possession of the certificates ef-
fected a transfer of the shares on the books 
of the corporation by supplying a bond and 
thereafter sold the shares. 
The parties proceeded to trial in the 
court below on the issue of whether or not 
the defendant had acquired ownership of 
the shares of stock by reason of a gift 
from the defendant's father to the defend-
ant's mother and in turn a gift from the de-
fendant's mother to the defendant. On 
conflicting testimony the trial court found 
that the defendant had failed to prove a 
gift by clear and convincing evidence from 
her father to her mother. The court con-
cluded that the plaintiff was entitled to 
judgment in an amount equal to the net 
proceeds on the sale of the stock by the 
defendant and also that the plaintiff was 
entitled to possession of a stock certificate 
not included in the sale. 
[1, 2] On appeal the defendant contends 
that the trial court erred in imposing upon 
the defendant the burden of proving her 
ownership of the shares of stock in ques-
tion by way of a gift by clear and con-
vincing evidence. It would appear to us 
that the defendant having acquired posses-
sion of the stock certificates which were 
carried on the books of the corporation in 
the name of the decedent George H. 
Buckley, and George H. Buckley not hav-
ing executed the stock transfer endorse-
ments which were a part of each certificate, 
the defendant did in fact have the burden 
of establishing her ownership by gift by 
clear and convincing proof.1 As this court 
has stated in numerous prior decisions we 
will not disturb the finding of the trial 
court unless that court has misapplied 
proven facts or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence."' 
[3] As a second claim of error on the 
part of the trial court, the defendant claims 
that after the death of George Hatton 
Buckley a de facto distribution of his 
estate was made by his widow and children 
at which time various items of personal 
property belonging to the decedent were 
given to the widow and children. Defend-
ant claims that the mother Pearl Murdock 
Buckley accepted the certificates of shares 
as a part of her share of the estate. The 
court below found that the evidence was in-
sufficient to show that Pearl Murdock 
Buckley received the shares of stock as a 
part of that de facto distribution. 
It is quite clear that the money and 
shares of stock when in the hands of ad-
ministrator should be distributed as assets 
of the estate of George Hatton Buckley. 
The judgment of the court below is affirm-
ed. Plaintiff is entitled to costs. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and HENRIOD and 
CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent. 
The evidence without contradiction 
shows that George Buckley gave the stock 
to his wife, Pearl Murdock Buckley, in 
1945. Apparently the trial judge elected 
not to believe the disinterested witnesses 
but instead based his opinion on what he 
must have conceived to be a rule of law. 
In his memorandum decision he stated: 
[T]he Court finds and con-
cludes that defendant has failed to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the 
decedent, George Hatton Buckley, made 
a gift to Pearl Murdock Buckley of the 
stock certificates in that he failed to 
endorse the stock certificates in Novem-
ber of 1945 ZL'hen he purportedly de-
2. Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 
2d 465. 
I. Jones v. Cook, 118 Utah 562, 223 P.2d 
423; Raleigh v. Wells, 29 Utah 217, 81 P. 
908; Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 
75 Utah 478, 286 P. 638; Greener v. 
Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194. 
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tlaicd he 7ici,
 l/r,nq same to Pearl Mur-
doch BHCUC\ and h,s failutc to dtvest 
lumsclf of tlu f,h,suai control of fhe 
idtificatcs at the time the purported 
deductions of
 t„ft Kcrc madc [ E m h a . 
MS added ] 
In the case o» J d > ] 0 r v Daynes, 118 
L t a h 6 1 , 218 V2<\ 1069 (1950), th.s court 
held that a sale of stock was made on July 
21, 1947, althoiiKh the stock certificate was 
not signed until 1 dmiar>, 1948 In de-
ciding the matt<r, t h i s c o „ r t quoted from 
the case of Joins
 v Commercial Invest-
ment Trust, 64 U»h 151, 228 P. 896 as 
:ollo«s "If thc>
 i ntend the title to be 
transferred when the contract is made 
it ,s a contract of sale, otherwise it is a 
contract to sell " 
I f G e o r
^
e B l
«*ley handed the stock to 
his wife, as the witnesses said he did, and 
at the time intended to give it to her, the 
gift was completed to the extent that she 
uould have the eqtntable title to it, which 
uould be good against all the world, and 
this is true even though the stock was not 
endorsed and was thereafter kept in a 
box to which George had access 
George Buckle* was injured, and from 
1931 to his death he was a semi-invalid 
and unable to work H1S W1fe, Pearl Mur-
dock Buckle}, worked as a janitress to sup-
port the famib They were poor, and 
uhen George died ,n 1950, the only assets 
he left were a small bank account, a ring, 
an old car, a feu
 u . i r bonds, and plaintiff 
bairns the stock m question which he had 
acquired while working the mine The 
stock at that tnm was worthless as an 
asset 
Gerald Buckle} testified for the plaintiff 
regarding the piopert> which his father, 
>eorge Buckle}, had left 
Q There was
 a division among the 
family of
 > 0 u r father's estate without 
probate proceedings? 
A I didn't know of any division of 
m> dad's propcrt\ 
Q Well, who got the property, then? 
V Well, just mother had it. 
In his deposition which was read Gerald 
Buckle> also testified 
Q But \ou made no claim to the 
stock ? 
A It was mom's stock 
\ppellant testified with reference to the 
assets of George Buckle} as follows 
Q What was done with respect to the 
war bonds and the old car? What was 
done with the old car and the bonds? 
A M} brother Bert sold the car And 
the war bonds and that was my mother's 
Q Was there any other property in 
the estate, that you know of? 
A Just my dad's ring 
Q Who got the ring? 
A Gerald 
The testimony was uncontradicted that 
Pearl Murdock Buckley gave the worthless 
stock to appellant sometime during 1960 
Although the stock in question was 
worthless, George Buckley always claimed 
that someday it might become valuable and 
it should be saved His son Gerald had 
some of the same stock, and the father 
told him to hold onto it and pay the assess-
ments, as it might become valuable 
George's belief seemed prophetic, and in 
1969 the stock in question was sold for 
$25,000 
For 19 years after his death neither of 
the sons of George Buckley made any 
claim to the stock in question In fact, in 
1968 Gerald Buckley told appellant to 
sell it and even signed a bond so she could 
have the stock transferred to her own name 
in order to sell it without probating the 
estate of their parents 
The plaintiff in its complaint shows that 
this matter is an attempt to get appellant to 
divide what she received from the sale of 
the stock with the other two heirs and is 
not a bona fide probate of the estate. 
Paragraph 8 of the complaint reads: 
That demand has been made upon the 
Defendant Lucille Buckley Hall by the 
other heirs and by the Administrator ap-
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pointed herein and that she has failed, 
neglected or refused to deliver to the oth-
er heirs their respective shares of the 
Estates. 
It does not appear that any effort has 
been made by the administrator to col-
lect from the other heirs the property which 
they received after the death of their 
father or mother. 
There is another matter not urged by 
appellant which should require a reversal 
of the judgment in this case. It involves 
the jurisdiction of the court to appoint 
the plaintiff as administrator of the two 
estates jointly, and we should notice mat-
ters of jurisdiction whenever we are aware 
of them whether urged or not. If we ig-
nore the matter now, we would simply 
make for other lawsuits, for if the admin-
istrator is not lawfully appointed, its acts 
are void and subject to collateral attack. 
The complaint states that plaintiff is 
the administrator of the estates of George 
Hatton Buckley and Pearl Murdock Buck-
ley; that there are three heirs; that the 
stock in question constitutes a part of the 
estate of George Hatton Buckley; and that 
the heirs are entitled to one-third equal 
share. 
The probating of estates of deceased per-
sons is purely statutory, and unless done 
according to the statute, the attempt to 
probate is a nullity. Section 75-4-6, U.C. 
A. 1953, provides for letters of administra-
tion upon several estates jointly under two 
conditions: 
(1) Where the estate of one deceased 
person has descended from another de-
ceased person whose estate has never been 
probated, or 
(2) Where two or more deceased persons 
held property as tenants in common, etc. 
Obviously these two estates cannot be 
jointly probated under (2) above, for it is 
not claimed that Mr. and Mrs. Buckley 
held anything as tenants in common. The 
I. In re Martin Estates, 109 Utah 131, 166 
P.2d 197 (1946). 
question arises: Did all of the estate of 
Mrs. Buckley descend from Mr. Buckley? 
In its complaint plaintiff says the shares 
of stock constituted "a major portion of 
the estates of George Hatton Buckley and 
possibly that of Pearl Murdock Buckley." 
It thus appears that each estate had other 
assets. 
In order for the two estates to be pro-
bated jointly under the provision of the 
statute, it is necessary that all of the estate 
of Mrs. Buckley be received from the estate 
of her deceased husband.1 If in fact the 
stock never left George's estate, as the 
trial court held, then a probate of George's 
estate would give one-third to Pearl Mur-
dock Buckley and two-ninths to each of 
the three children.2 If then Pearl gave 
the stock to appellant, as the undisputed 
evidence shows, then appellant would get 
five-ninths of the stock and her two broth-
ers only two-ninths each. The trial judge 
made no finding as to whether Pearl gave 
to appellant the one-third interest which de-
scended to her, holding it had no legal 
consequences. If Mrs. Buckley gave to ap-
pellant all of her interest in the stock, 
there would be nothing to probate in her 
estate, which plaintiff claims descended to 
her from the estate of her husband. 
It is, therefore, necessary to determine 
whether Pearl gave her one-third interest 
to appellant, and the court erred in holding 
that whether or not the gift was made was 
of no legal consequence. 
Since the complaint shows that the es-
tates could not be probated jointly, the 
plaintiff has no standing to maintain this 
action. 
I would reverse the judgment and re-
mand the case with directions to dismiss 
the action. I would award costs to the ap-
pellant. 
At least the case should be remanded for 
a determination of the issue of whether or 
not Pearl Murdock Buckley gave her share 
of the stock to the appellant. 
2. Section 74-4-5(1), U.C.A.1953. 
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STANLEY v. STANLEY, 
No. 6110. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 14, 1939. 
1. Appeal and error <§=>I009(3) 
In equity case findings of trial court on 
conflicting evidence will not be set aside un-
less it manifestly appears that the court has 
misapplied proven facts or made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence.! 
2. Deeds <S=>208(3) 
In quiet title action involving issue 
whether testator had delivered deed to wid-
ow, widow's testimony that she saw testator 
removing deed from his pocket, that he re-
marked that he had present for her and 
handed deed to her requesting that deed be 
not recorded until after his death* and that 
thereafter deed remained in her possession, 
justified inference that deed was delivered 
and was prima facie sufficient for that pur-
pose, but such inference was not conclusive. 
3. Deeds &=> 194(2) 
Presumption of delivery arising from 
grantee's possession of deed was not conclu-
sive. 
4. Evidence <§=?269(2) 
In quiet title action involving question 
whether testator had delivered deed to his 
widow with intent to pass title, testator's 
statement after alleged delivery that he 
was owner of property was admissible only 
upon question of intent to presently pass 
title if in fact there had been a manual de-
livery. 
5. Deeds ©=>56(2) 
"Delivery" of a deed is essentially a 
matter of intent which intent is to be ar-
rived at from all facts and surrounding cir-
cumstances. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Deliver; Delivery," eee Words & Phras-
es.] 
6. Evidence €=>269(3) 
Declarations of grantor before and after 
date of deed, at least where it appears that 
. STANLEY Utah 463 
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the declarations were made fairly and in or-
dinary course of life, can be considered in 
determining whether deed was delivered 
with intent to presently pass title.* 
7. Deeds <©=>208(l) 
In quiet title action involving question 
whether testator had delivered deed to wid-
ow with intent to presently pass title, evi-
dence sustained trial court's finding that 
deed had not been delivered with such in-
tent even if widow had been permitted to 
testify as to the manual delivery of the 
deed. Rev.St.1933, 104-49-2. 
Appeal from Second District Court, 
Weber County; E. E. Pratt, Judge. 
Action to quiet title by Lily E. Stanley, 
executrix of the last will and testament of 
Willis O. Stanley, deceased, against Emily 
C. Stanley. Judgment for plaintiff, and 
defendant appeals. 
Affirmed. 
DeVine, Howell & Stine and Neil R. 
Olmstead, all of Ogden, for appellant. 
Thatcher & Young and Valentine Gid-
eon, all of Ogden, for respondent 
EVANS, District Judge. 
This is an action to quiet title to cer-
tain premises in Ogden, Utah, and desig-
nated as 823 and 825 Twenty-Fifth Street. 
Willis O. Stanley died on November 17, 
1937, leaving as his survivors the defend-
ant, his widow, and George C. Stanley and 
Lucile Stanley, children by adoption. 
Willis 0 . Stanley will be hereafter refer-
red to as the testator. He and the defend-
ant had been married some fifty years pri-
or to his death and had lived together un-
til 1932, at which time they separated. 
The testator had for many years been em-
ployed as a travelling salesman on a sal-
ary of $250 per month, one-half of which 
he regularly remitted to the defendant, 
which, together with rentals received from 
properties acquired during the marriage, 
she deposited in the bank as a joint ac-
count. Of the various properties acquired, 
all were taken in the name of the defend-
1 Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 
P. 313; Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 
45, 57 P. 712; Singleton v. Kelly, 61 
Utah 277, 212 P. 63, 66; Holman v. 
Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 457; 
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 
94 P.2d—30 
513, 101 A.L.R. 532; Wilcox v. Cloward, 
88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1; Hoyt v. Upper 
Marion Ditch Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P.2d 
234. 
2 Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 
P. 911. 
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ant, except the property here in question, 
which stood on the records in the name 
of the testator. All living expenses and 
all expenses incident to the upkeep of these 
properties were paid from this joint ac-
count by checks drawn by the defendant, 
who assumed the general management of 
the properties because of the testator's fre-
quent absences from home. Sometime aft-
er 1929 the defendant closed this joint ac-
count and opened an account in her own 
name which Was, however, handled in the 
same way as had been the joint account. 
In the year 1906, the testator executed 
a deed conveying the premises in question 
to the defendant. This deed was record-
ed three months after the death of the tes-
tator. The plaintiff, while admitting the 
execution of the deed, contends that it was 
never delivered. The defendant, on the 
other hand, contends and offered evidence 
to support her contention that the deed was 
delivered. The trial court found the issues 
in favor of the plaintiff upon what appears 
to be conflicting evidence. 
[1] The scope of the review on appeal 
in equity cases is clearly settled in this ju-
risdiction. "This court is authorized by 
the state Constitution to review the find-
ings of the trial courts in equity cases, but 
the findings of the trial courts on conflict-
ing evidence will not be set aside unless 
it manifestly appears that the court has 
misapplied proven facts or made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence." 
Ohvero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 
313, 315. 
To the same effect are Klopenstine v. 
Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712; Singleton 
v. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63, 66; Hol-
man v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 
457; Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 
P.2d 513, 101 A.L.R. 532; Wilcox v. Cow-
ard, 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1; Hoyt v. Upper 
Marion Ditch Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P.2d 
234. 
Let it be here observed that it is not 
contended that there is not a substantial 
conflict in the evidence. The defendant, 
however, assigns as error the ruling of the 
court in excluding the defendant's testi-
mony of the delivery of the deed to her 
by the testator shortly after its execution, 
and upon the same principle that the court 
erred in not permitting her to identify the 
signature of the testator to a document 
which, it is claimed, would tend to support 
her cla,m of ownership. It is further con-
tended by the defendant that the court 
should have excluded statements made by 
the testator to third persons to the effect 
that he owned the property. Had the court 
adopted the defendant's theory and admit-
ted the evidence offered by the defendant 
and had excluded evidence offered by the 
plaintiff over defendant's objection, that 
would not, however, dispose of the con-
flict, but it is insisted that except for the 
errors complained of the evidence would 
have so preponderated in favor of the de-
fendant as to lead to a different conclu-
sion. 
The testimony upon which the plaintiff 
relies, and which it is contended is incon-
sistent with the defendant's claim that the 
deed was delivered to her, may be briefly 
summarized, as follows: 
The testator left the management of the 
various properties acquired by them be-
fore their separation, including 823 and 
825 Twenty-Fifth Street, to the defendant. 
Shortly after their separation the testator 
consulted counsel about obtaining payment 
of the rents on these houses directly to 
him. In February, 1934, he notified the 
defendant that he would thereafter care 
for his property, shortly after which he 
rented one house, and in May, 1935, moved 
into the other, occupying a part and rent-
ing a part. He exercised exclusive own-
ership of this property until his death in 
November, 1937. In 1935 he mortgaged 
the property without objection from the 
defendant, or the assertion of any claim 
of ownership, although she refused to join 
in the mortgage. The testator left a will 
devising his real property to the plaintiff 
personally. He neither claimed or owned 
any other real estate. The defendant had 
access to the desk in which he kept his 
papers at all times since the execution of 
the deed under which she claims, and aft-
er the death of testator his personal ef-
fects were removed to the home of de-
fendant. In 1934, the testator left with 
one Forrest all the keys to the property 
and defendant demanded of him that he 
deliver the keys to her, which demand was 
refused on the ground that she was not 
the owner. She at that time asserted no 
claim of ownership. Immediately after 
the death of the testator the defendant fil-
ed a petition for the probate of a will dat-
ed in 1892, in which the defendant was the 
sole beneficiary. She alleged in a -verified 
petition that the testator owned the prop-
erty in question at the time of his death 
The defendant had alwa)s attended to the 
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incidents of acquiring, renting and pre-
serving her own property and was there-
fore familiar with the matters entering in-
to the transfer of titles. When told that 
some wall paper had been sent to the tes-
tator's place on 25th Street, the defendant 
said: "If it had gone up to my place you 
would have gotten that money." Pending 
the proceedings for probate of the 1892 
will, a later will was discovered by George 
C. Stanley, dated in 1934, in which the 
plaintiff was made the sole beneficiary. 
The defendant was advised of the discov-
ery and the will was filed with the Clerk 
of the Court on November 27, 1937. On 
December 8, 1937, the defendant received 
notice of the hearing on the petition for 
probate of the later will. The deed was 
filed for record by the defendant on Feb-
ruary 15, 1938. Shortly before that, ac-
cording to the testimony of her daughter 
Emily, the defendant brought out a box 
and looking over the papers she found that 
deed. In 1913, the testator procured in-
surance in his own name on the property 
in question, which he renewed from time 
to time until shortly before his death. The 
defendant insured her properties with the 
same agency. Due to the testator's fre-
quent absences the policies and statements 
for premiums were usually mailed to the 
defendant, who promptly paid the premi-
ums upon the several properties standing 
in her name. The testator invariably paid 
the premium on the property here in ques-
tion, except the last premium on the pol-
icy issued shortly before the testator's 
death, and for which a claim has been filed 
against the estate. 
With respect to the delivery of the deed, 
the trial court excluded evidence offered 
by the defendant as to the formal act of 
delivery as being incompetent under the 
provisions of Section 104-49-2, R.S.U. 1933. 
However, she was permitted to testify that 
she first saw the deed on May 19, 1906, in 
the testator's hands and next saw it in her 
own hands after which she immediately 
placed it in a tin box; that when she first 
saw the deed the testator was removing it 
from his pocket, remarking that he had 
a present for her, and handed it to her, 
and that she paid him a dollar, requesting 
however, that the deed be not recorded un-
til after his death, and that thereafter it 
remained in her possession. 
[2,3] This testimony would undoubted-
ly justify an inference that the deed was 
delivered and should be considered prima 
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facie sufficient for that purpose. The in-
ference is not conclusive, nor would the 
presumption arising from the possession 
of the deed by the defendant be conclu-
sive. 
[4-6] Was the behavior of the testator 
and of the defendant subsequent to their 
separation inconsistent with the claim that 
the deed was delivered with intent to pres-
ently pass title? It is apparent that the 
testator thereafter exercised all of the in-
dicia of ownership by entering into the ex-
clusive possession of the premises, taking 
insurance in his own name, redeeming the 
property from a tax sale, mortgaging the 
property with the knowledge of the defend-
ant, disposing of the property by will, col-
lecting rents, paying taxes and assuming 
all expenses of upkeep, all without any 
protest or objection or claim by or on be-
half of the defendant. In the course of 
these various transactions he had repeat-
edly stated and represented that he was 
the owner of the property, such statements, 
however, being admissible only upon the 
question of intent to presently pass title, if 
in fact there had been a manual delivery. 
"Since delivery is essentially a matter 
of intent, which intent is to be arrived at 
from all the facts and surrounding circum-
stances, we believe the better rule is to in-
clude in those facts and circumstances dec-
larations of the grantor both before and 
after the date of the deed, at least where 
it appears that the declarations are made 
fairly and in the ordinary course of life." 
Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911, 
914. 
Then also these declarations were rein-
forced by the sworn declaration of the de-
fendant in her petition for probate of a 
will to the effect that the testator was the 
owner of this property at the time of his 
death. 
In this respect a very natural question 
presents itself. If, as the defendant claims, 
she had in her possession the deed at the 
time of testator's death, why not then re-
cord the deed instead of offering the will 
for probate, and thus avoid subjecting the 
property to the claims of creditors, not to 
mention the difference in the expense of 
the two respective procedures? Then a 
later will is found which is filed for pro-
bate in which the plaintiff is named as 
beneficiary and of which proceedings the 
defendant had notice. Some three months 
elapsed before the deed was placed of rec-
ord. Had the defendant been mentally m-
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firm, or inexperienced in matters of busi-
ness, or indifferent to her own interests, 
or had she forgotten about the deed, such 
might afford some explanation of these in-
consistencies. The record, however, dis-
closes no satisfactory explanation of the 
defendant's extraordinary behavior, and 
the facts tend quite convincingly to sup-
port the plaintiff's theory that the deed was 
discovered among the testator's papers aft-
er the later will had been filed for probate. 
[7] As we view the evidence in this 
case the findings of the trial court are 
amply supported by the evidence, and this 
would be true even though the defendant 
had been permitted to testify as to the man-
ual delivery of the deed, and quite as ef-
fectually disposes of all presumptions in 
the defendant's favor which would cast the 
burden of proving non-delivery upon the 
plaintiff. 
There being no reversible error, the judg-
ment is affirmed, with costs to the respond-
ent. 
MOFFAT, C. J., and LARSON and Mc-
DONOUGH, JJ., concur. 
WOLFE, Justice (concurring). 
I concur in the results. It would per-
haps be well if we fastened upon an ac-
curate and consistent expression of the ju-
dicial policy of this court in the review 
of equity cases. The Constitution of Utah, 
Art. VIII, Sec. 9, not only gives us au-
thority but makes it our duty to review 
the facts. This has been construed to mean 
that we review and weigh the evidence as 
it appears in the record. Lund v. Howell, 
92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215 (followed in Id., 
92 Utah 250, 67 P.2d 223); Christenson v. 
Nielsen, 88 Utah 336, 54 P.2d 430, 432 
(where this court held that in an equity 
case the appellate court was "compelled to 
review the record and pass on the weight 
and sufficiency of the evidence"); Buzianis 
v. Buzianis, 81 Utah 1/16 P.2d 413 (where 
the court held that where there was a con-
flict in the evidence it was the court's duty 
"to pass upon the relative weight there-
of"). 
The cases are replete with expressions 
as to the tests to be applied to determine 
when we will reverse or affirm m an equity 
case. They vary considerably. Hereun-
der are cited cases from this jurisdiction 
with various expressions used. Skola v. 
Merrill, 91 Utah 253, 64 P.2d 185 (where 
this court reversed the trial court because 
the "fair preponderance" of the evidence 
was the other way); Chapman v. Troy 
Laundry Co., 87 Utah 15, 47 P.2d 1054, 
1056 (where it was held that the Supreme 
Court has the burden of determining 
"whether the findings of fact are support-
ed by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence") ; Transfer Realty Co. v. Lichfield, 
84 Utah 163, 33 P.2d 179, 181, rehearing 
denied, 85 Utah 451, 39 P.2d 752 (where 
it was held that this court "may examine 
the evidence to determine whether or not 
the trial court's findings are supported by 
a preponderance of the evidence"); Lake 
Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 
50 Utah 76, 166 P. 309, 310, L.R.A.1918B, 
620 (where it was held that the Supreme 
Court has the power "to review the testi-
mony for the purpose of determining what 
the facts are * * * even though its 
views are in conflict with the findings of 
the trial court"); Forbes v. Butler, 66 
Utah 373, 242 P. 950, 951 (holding it in-
cumbent on the court "to review the evi-
dence and decide the case according to the 
facts as we find them to be, bearing m 
mind legal presumptions in favor of the 
judgment"); and Garfield Banking Co. v. 
Arg>le, 64 Utah 572, 232 P. 541, 542 (hold-
ing that the Supreme Court in weighing 
evidence should take into consideration the 
fact that the "trial court was not bound 
to give the same weight or effect to all 
the statements made by the several wit-
nesses"). 
In Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 
513, 520, 101 A.L.R. 532, a well considered 
case, it was stated: "After a careful read-
ing of the entire testimony of this witness, 
and weighing the same along with the ad-
mitted facts in the case, we do not feel sat-
isfied that the finding ought to be disturb-
ed. The trial judge did not accept the 
testimony of this witness in full. The tri-
al judge had a better opportunity from 
seeing and hearing the witness than we 
have from merely reading the transcript 
to appraise his credibility and to determine 
what weight should be given to his tes-
timony. The opinion of the trial judge is 
therefore entitled to some weight with us." 
Other cases containing similar expres-
sions are as follows: Williams v. Peter-
son, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674; Silver King 
Consol. Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297, 
39 P.2d 682, Corev v. Roberts, 82 Utah 
445, 25 P.2d 940, Consolidated Wagon & 
Machine Co. v. Ka\, 81 Utah 595, 21 P. 
STANLEY v. STANLEY 
84 P.2d 4*5 
Utah 469 
2d 836; Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 
389, 274 P. 457; Warner v. Tyng Ware-
house Co., 71 Utah 303, 265 P. 748; Eph-
raim Willow Creek Irr. Co. v. Olson, 70 
Utah 95, 258 P. 216; Schulder v. Dickson, 
66 Utah 418, 243 P. 377; Jenkins v. Nic-
olas, 63 Utah 329, 226 P. 177; McKellar 
Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Paxton, 
62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128; Lawley v. Hick-
enlooper, 61 Utah 298, 212 P. 526; Brack-
en v. Chadburn, 55 Utah 430, 185 P. 1021; 
Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 
10, 177 P. 418; Campbell v. Gowans, 35 
Utah 268, 100 P. 397, 23 L.R.A.,N.S., 414, 
19 Ann.Cas. 660 (followed in Utah Com. 
& Savings Bank v. Fox, 44 Utah 323, 140 
P. 660; and Little v. Stringfellow, 46 Utah 
576, 151 P. 347): Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah 
609, 151 P. 57; Froyd v. Barnhurst, 83 
Utah 271, 28 P.2d 135; Paxton v. Paxton, 
80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051; Thomas v. But-
ler, 77 Utah 402, 296 P. 597; Clark v. 
Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502; Olivero 
v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313 (and 
cases cited); Singleton v. Kelly, 61 Utah 
277, 212 P. 63 (and cases cited); Rieske 
v. Hoover, 53 Utah 87, 177 P. 228. 
The expressions range all the way from 
that which says a review in equity in this 
court is a trial de novo on the record, to 
that taken from Olivero v. Eleganti, su-
pra, contained in the main opinion. 
I opine that what was really meant was 
that on review we would go over the rec-
ord to determine what our conclusions of 
fact were from the transcript of the evi-
dence, and if at the end of that investiga-
tion we were in doubt or even if there 
might be a slight preponderance in our 
minds against the trial court's conclusions, 
we would affirm. This is because we 
would be confined to the dry written rec-
ord and would not have the benefit of see-
ing and hearing the witnesses. In some 
cases that would be quite valuable while 
in others, where the evidence was purely 
or almost altogether documentary, it might 
be practically valueless. Such a distinc-
tion was noted in the concurring opinion 
in Greco v. Grako, 85 Utah 241, 39 P.2d 
318, 322, where it was said: "I am not 
unmindful of the rule to the effect that, 
^while a written record in an equity case 
tnay apparently show the preponderance 
of evidence in favor of a conclusion dif-
ferent from that reached by the trial judge, 
still the benefit of the doubt should be giv-
en to his conclusions where the imponder-
ables, not revealed by the record, such as 
the manner and demeanor of the witnesses 
(very important indexes to credibility), 
might weigh in the scale sufficiently to re-
verse that apparent preponderance of the 
record. Where, however, the preponder-
ance shown by the record is so great in 
favor of a conclusion different from that 
arrived at by the trial judge that the un-
recorded parts of the trial could not rea-
sonably be expected to change such appar-
ent preponderance, or where, as in this 
case, some fact independent of any ele-
ment which might affect the credibility of 
witnesses speaks eloquently of a wrong 
conclusion by the trial judge, the rule does 
not apply." 
The reason then that we have the ex-
pressions that in order to reverse there 
must be shown a "clear preponderance" or 
"fair preponderance" of the evidence the 
other way or that we must "bear in mind 
legal presumptions in favor of the judg-
ment" etc., is because of this recognition 
that the lower court had the witnesses be-
fore it and was better able to judge of their 
credibility. This is borne out by the fol-
lowing expressions: 
In Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d 
940, 942, the court held: "In equity cases 
the appeal (Const. Utah, art. 8, § 9) may 
be on questions of both law and fact. Such 
is the appeal in this case. On such re-
view the duty of this court requires an 
examination of all questions of law and 
all facts revealed by the record, and, aft-
er making such examination and due al-
lowance for the better opportunity afford-
ed the trial court to observe the demean-
or of witnesses, and more advantageous 
position of determining their credibility 
and the weight to be given to the testi-
mony submitted, this court, analogous to 
a trial de novo on the record, will deter-
mine from a fair preponderance or great-
er weight of the evidence whether or not 
the findings of the trial court are support-
ed thereby. Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 
Utah 298, 212 P. 526." 
In Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 
supra, the court stated [53 Utah 10, 177 
P. 420]: "While this court will, and it 
is its duty in equitable proceedings to, re-
view the testimony and determine its 
weight, of necessity much consideration 
must and will be given to the trial courts 
findings, not only because such court heard 
the witnesses and had an opportunity to 
observe their demeanor upon the witness 
stand, their means of knowledge, their in-
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terests, etc., but particularly in this case 
greater consideration should be given to 
the court's finding by reason of the court's 
opportunity in visiting the plant and vicin-
ity, and seeing from personal investigation 
and observation the conditions that exist 
there." 
I think hardly accurate the expression in 
Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., supra, that 
the Supreme Court has the burden of de-
termining "whether the findings of fact 
are supported by a fair preponderance of 
the evidence." Our duty is to make an in-
dependent examination of the record. If 
after that we find (1) the preponderance 
of the evidence supports the trial court's 
findings of fact, or (2) if there is doubt 
in our minds as to where the preponder-
ance lies, or (3) we think the evidence as 
revealed by the record may slightly pre-
ponderate against its conclusions but such 
preponderance may well be offset in fa-
vor of his conclusions by having seen the 
witnesses and been able to judge by their 
demeanor as to their credibility, then we 
will not reverse. The expressions that 
there must be a "clear" or "fair" prepon-
derance of the evidence against the find-
ings of the trial judge, seek to allow for 
his advantaged position in having seen the 
behavior of the witnesses on the stand. 
In short, as held in Wilcox v. Cloward, 
88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1, if after we re-
view the record we cannot say that the 
court came to a wrong conclusion, we 
should affirm. We do not reverse if we 
find the court's findings supported by a 
fair preponderance of the evidence, or if 
supported only by a slight preponderance, 
or if the evidence is evenly balanced, or 
even if there is in the record a slight pre-
ponderance the other way, for the reasons 
above set out. 
Being convinced that evidence of deliv-
ery of the deed from Willis O. Stanley to 
Emily C. Stanley should not be received 
because Emily C Stanley was incompetent 
under Sec. 104-49-2, R.S.U.1933, I shall 
treat the case as if there was no evidence 
of delivery. This makes it unnecessary 
for me to determine whether declarations 
of a decedent tending to show ownership 
in him after a manual handing of a deed 
from himself to another when the deed ran 
to that other are admissible in evidence 
to find the intent with which the deed was 
so handed, especially where not made con-
temporaneously with the manual act. I 
am not prepared, without further research, 
to subscribe to the doctrine of Mower v. 
Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911, although 
it may be the law of this state. 
It may be contended that even though 
there is no direct evidence of manual hand-
ing over from Willis to Emily Stanley, the 
inference from her testimony that she saw 
the deed in his hand and next saw it in 
her hand raises the inference of delivery. 
While I have grave doubts whether the 
rule of Sec. 104-49-2, R.S.U.1933, may be 
circumvented by admitting every fact sur-
rounding the fact which is to be conclud-
ed from them, when such facts themselves 
were "equally within the knowledge", no 
cross assignment of error was made as to 
their admission hence they must stand as 
correctly admitted for this review. But I 
do not think the inference that a manual 
handing over took place need be indulged. 
Certainly when the facts from which we 
are asked to infer were wrongly admitted 
and we are asked to draw an inference 
which will reverse the trial court in its 
findings, we will do so only when it is the 
necessary and only inference. I do not see 
that it is such in this case. For that rea-
son I found my concurrence on the as-
sumption that it does not appear in this 
case that there was any delivery of the 
deed. 
PRATT, J., being disqualified, did not 
participate herein. 
CHOURNOS v. EVONA INV. CO. et al. 
No. 6092. 
> Supreme Court of Utah. 
I Oct. 17, 1939. 
I Landlord and tenant <§=>95 
» Joint lease of grazing land, which pro-
r vided that, in event of a sale of land being 
j made to any person not a party to the lease, 
> the lessees 6hould be given one year within 
i which to vacate the premises, after which 
i the lease should be canceled, contemplated 
» that, except for a purchase by a stranger, 
5 each lessee should continue the grazing of 
. sheep upon the land at least for the period 
[ of the lease, and hence, if purchase of the 
leased premises by a lessee's son was made 
TabF 
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It appears that appellants, the prevailing 
parties on their appeal, presented to the 
clerk a duly certified cost bill for his ap-
proval and allowance. The item objected to 
and sustained by the clerk is as follows: 
"Paid to Lew Rogers, court reporter, for 
typing transcript testimony of proceedings used 
in the transcript on appeal, $276.31." 
The clerk ruled, that the item was not a 
proper item of costs authorized by section 1 
of rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules. We 
are not in accord with this ruling. The 
rule itself furnishes a sufficient answer to 
the objection to the allowance of the item. 
Section 1 provides as follows: 
"The expense of printing or typewriting tran-
scripts • * * on appeal in civil causes * * * 
shall be allowed as costs, and taxed in bills of 
costs in the usual mode. * * * " 
No sufficient reason appears why appel-
lants should not be allowed the expense of 
transcribing the testimony upon which their 
appeal was based, and which was actually 
used on appeal. 
The clerk's'decision is reversed. 
COLEMAN, C. J., and DUCKER, J., con-
cur. 
GRAY'S HARBOR LUMBER CO. V. BUR-
TON LUMBER CO. (No. 4106.) 
' (Supreme Court of Utah. May 11, 1925.) 
1. Appeal and error G=>277—Only such mat-
ters reviewed as deemed excepted to under 
statute, where no objection nor exception 
saved below. 
Where defendant interposed no objection 
and saved no exception in district court, Su-
preme Court can only examine such matters as 
are deemed excepted to under the statute. 
2. Judgment €=»18(2)—Complaint in action on 
trade acceptances held not so lacking in es-
sential averments as not to support judgment 
for plaintiff. 
ID action against drawee and acceptor on 
trade acceptance being an action on written in-
strument for payment of money only, com-
plaint, which did not specifically allege owner-
ship or right of possession, held not so lacking 
in essential averments as not to support judg-
ment for plaintiff especially in view of fact that 
no defense was interposed under general denial. 
3. Bills and notes C=>524—Plaintiff suing on 
trade acceptances held to have made prima 
facie case of ownership by producing instru-
ment, where no proof to contrary. 
An action on trade acceptances, being an ac-
tion on written instrument for recovery of 
money only, where instrument was in posses-
sion of plaintiff and was produced in court, 
presumption that plaintiff was owner prevailed, 
and, in absence of proof to contrary, plaintiff 
made out a prima fade case. 
4. Bills and notes £=»395—Presentment for 
payment unnecessary In action against 
drawee and acceptor. 
Under Comp. Laws 1917, § 4105, in action 
on trade acceptances against drawee and ac-
ceptor, who is primarily liable, presentment for 
payment is not necessary. 
5. Corporations ^=>5I4(I)—Contention that 
complaint failed to allege plaintiff's capacity 
_ to sue without merit where defendant ad-
mitted that plaintiff was a corporation. 
Contention that complaint failed to allege 
plaintiff's capacity to sue held without merit, 
where defendant admitted that plaintiff was a 
corporation, thus admitting its capacity to sue. 
6. Appeal and error €=>1170(3)—Failure of 
complaint to allege acceptance of trade ac-
ceptances by defendant held harmless, where 
proof thereof made without objection or ex-
ception by defendant. 
Though complaint in action on trade accept-
ances did not expressly allege acceptance by 
defendant, Held that, in view of Comp. Laws 
1917, § 6622, where plaintiff proved fact of ac-
ceptance, and no objection or exception was 
taken to 6uch proof, failure of complaint to so-
allege was harmless. 
7. Bills and notes <g=>485—General denial of 
execution of written instrument or corporate 
capacity of plaintiff held insufficient. 
Under Comp. Laws 1917, § 6594, providing 
that allegations of execution of written instru-
ment, existence of corporation, etc., shall be 
taken as true unless denial thereof be verified 
by affidavit, defendant, intending to assail any 
of such matters, should clearly specify which 
one he desires to assail, and a mere general 
denial is insufficient, i 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake-
County; Ephraim Hanson, Judge. 
Action by the Gray's Harbor Lumber Com-
pany against the Burton Lumber Company. 
Judgment for plaintiff on appeal from city-
court, and defendant appeals. Modified, and 
affirmed as modified. 
Ball, Musser & Robertson, of Salt Lak* 
City, for appellant 
Irvine, Skeen & Thurman, of Salt Lake 
City, for respondent 
FRICK, J. This action was commenced in-
the city court of Salt Lake City. Judgment 
was there entered in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant, and the latter 
appealed to the district court of Salt Lake 
county. 
The complaint in the city court, omitting, 
the prayer, reads as follows: 
"Comes now the plaintiff and for cause al-
leges: 
44(1) That it is a company organized under 
and pursuant to the laws of the state of Wash-
ington. 
<£=»For other cases Bee same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 
1
 Brewer v. Romney, 50 Utah, 236, 167 P. 366. 
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"(2) That on or about the 30th day of Sep-
tember, 1922, the defendant made, executed, 
and delivered to the plaintiff its trade accept-
ance in words and figures as follows, to wit: 
Trade Acceptance. $439 58. Salt Lake City, 
Utah, Sept. 30, 1922. 60 days after date pay 
to the order of Gray's Harbor Lbr. Co. four 
hundred thirty-nine and 58-100 dollars. The 
obligation of the acceptor of this bill arises out 
of the purchase of goods from drawer. The 
drawee may make this trade acceptance pay-
able at any bank, banker or trust company 
which he may designate. Gray's Harbor Lum-
ber Co., by C. G. Blagdon, Secretary. To Bur-
ton Lumber Company, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Accepted Sept. 30, 1922, payable Continental 
National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah. Burton 
Lumber Company, by W. J. Burton, Treaa.' 
"(3) That thereafter plaintiff duly present-
ed said trade acceptance for payment through 
the said Continental National Bank, and the 
same was returned with protest fees in the 
amount of $4.77, and that, although demand 
has been made, the said trade acceptance or no 
part thereof has been paid." 
In the city court a general demurrer was 
interposed to the complaint, which was over-
ruled. 
The defendant's answer, omitting the in-
troduction and the prayer, reads as follows: 
"(1) Admits the allegations contained in 
paragraph 1 of said complaint. 
"(2) Denies each and every allegation and 
averment in said complaint not hereinabove 
specifically admitted." 
Both the complaint and the answer were 
duly verified. No pleadings were filed in the 
district court, and no ruling of any kind re-
specting the pleadings filed in the city court 
was made in the district court. 
Upon the issues presented by the com-
plaint and answer, the case proceeded to 
trial in the district court. The plaintiff pro-
duced the original trade acceptance and 
offered the same in evidence, together with 
the indorsements thereon. His counsel then 
turned to defendant's counsel and asked 
whether the latter admitted nonpayment 
Counsel for defendant said he assumed that 
the fact that the acceptance was outstand-
ing was evidence of its nonpayment. The 
plaintiff then rested. The defendant, with-
out any objection or taking any exception, 
and without producing evidence, also rested. 
The court made findings in favor of the 
plaintiff, and entered judgment accordingly. 
Defendant filed its motion for a new trial, 
which was overruled, and this appeal fol-
lowed. 
[1] Notwithstanding the fact that no ob-
jection was interposed and no exception tak-
en in the district court, twenty-seven errors 
are assigned in this court, nearly all of 
which are relied on for a reversal of the 
Judgment In view that the defendant in-
terposed no objection and saved no excep-
tions in the district court, we can examine 
:o v BiiiTor; LUMBEP CO. no) 
P ) 
only such matters as are deemed excepted 
to under the statute. 
[2, 3] It is insisted that the complaint fails 
to state a cause of action. We have set 
forth both the complaint and the answer 
in fulL While the complaint is far from 
being a model pleading, yet it is not so 
lacking in essential averments that it will 
not support a judgment. In passing upon 
the sufficiency of a complaint we must keep 
in mind that the demurrer was not called 
to the attention of the district court, and 
that that court made no ruling whatever 
with respect thereto. True, a demurrer was 
interposed in the city court, but an answer 
was subsequently filed in that court. The 
case, it seems, was considered in the dis-
trict court entirely upon the complaint and 
answer. Moreover, the action is based upon 
a written instruments for the recovery of 
money only. The instrument was in the 
possession of the plaintiff and was produced 
in court. Under all the authorities, there-
fore, the presumption that the plaintiff was 
the owner prevailed, and, in the absence of 
any proof to the contrary, the plaintiff made 
out a prima facie case when it produced 
the instrument The contention, therefore, 
that the plaintiff must fail because it failed 
to allege ownership or right of possession 
is without merit. 
[4] It is further contended that the plain-
tiff must fail because it did not prove pre-
sentment for payment. This action is 
against the drawee and acceptor who is 
primarily liable. In such an action present-
ment for payment is not necessary. Comp. 
Laws Utah 1917, { 4105; Brannan's Neg. 
Inst. Law (3d Ed.) 255, § 70. 
[5] It is further contended that the com-
plaint failed to allege plaintiff's capacity to 
sue. In view *)f the state of the pleadings, 
as will hereinafter more fully appear, there 
is no merit to this contention. Moreover, 
the record discloses that the defendant ad-
mitted that the plaintiff was a corporation 
and hence admitted its capacity to sue. 
16] It is, however, strenuously insisted 
that the complaint was fatally defective 
because it did not allege acceptance by the 
defendant It is true that the plaintiff did 
not in express terms allege acceptance, but 
it certainly proved the fact of acceptance. 
No objection was interposed nor any excep-
tion taken to the proof. In view of that, 
this case falls squarely within the provi-
sions of our statute (Comp. Laws Utah 
1917, { 6622), which provides: 
"The court most in every stage of an action 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings 
or proceedings, which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties, and no judgment 
shall be reversed or affected by reason of such 
error or defect" 
Let it be remembered also that this is an 
action to recover upon a written instrument 
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for the payment of money only. Judgment 1 
was entered against the -defendant in two 
courts. No defense of any kind was inter-
posed, and no explanation was made why 
judgment should not be so entered. No de-
fense or explanation is now suggested; yet 
it is vigorously contended that the allega-
tions of the complaint are insufficient to 
authorize a judgment. We have already 
pointed out that, while the complaint is lack-
ing in specific averments, it nevertheless is I 
not so lacking in essentials as to authorize 
this court to reverse the judgment. This is 
especially true in view that the answer of 
the defendant fails to state any defense 
whatever. True, the answer is a general 
denial, but what does it deny? Can one, 
by a mere general denial, and without any 
proof whatever, prevent a recovery upon a 
written instrument for the payment of mon-
ey only where such instrument is produced in 
court by the terms of which appellant's 
promise to pay and its failure to do so are 
clearly established? Would it not be ameTe 
travesty of justice to hold that, although 
*he defendant voluntarily obligated itself to 
pay and plaintiff has proved the promise 
and the failure to redeem the obligation, 
it nevertheless must be thrown out of court 
because of some assumed technical defect 
in the complaint? In view of the nature 
of the action and the proceedings, and the 
utter failure of the defendant to suggest or 
to present any defense to the written instru-
ment at any time save by merely interposing 
a general denial, there can be no question 
respecting plaintiff's right to judgment. 
[7] The objections to the complaint prac-
tically all belong to that class which are 
admitted unless specifically denied. This 
court has already held that under our stat-
ute (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, f 6594) the 
execution of an instrument is not available 
under a general denial. Brewer v. Romney, 
50 Utah, 236, 167 P. 366. That section pro-
vides: 
"In all actions, allegations of the execution 
of written instruments and indorsements there-
on, of the existence of a corporation or part- I 
nership, or of any appointment or authority, or 
the correctness of any account duly verified by 
the affidavit of the party, his agent or attorney, 
shall be taken as true, unless the denial of the 
same be verified by the affidavit of the party, 
his agent or attorney." 
If that section means anything, it means 
that, unless the defendant specifically denies 
the matters enumerated in the section they 
will be "taken as true.'* The statute is 
wholesome and of the highest utility. The 
matters referred to in the statute, while es-
sential in a pleading, are nevertheless mora 
or less formal. Moreover, they occur in al-
most all actions and are seldom assailed. In 
-view of that, it is but fair and just, and 
certainly comports with the due and just ad-
ministration of justice, that, in case a de-
fendant intends to assail any of those for-
mal matters, he should specifically indicate 
it in his answer. Moreover, he should clear-
ly specify which one of the several matters 
he desires to assail, so that proper prepara-
tion can be made on the part of the plain-
tiff to establish the matter or matters in 
dispute. If a mere general denial is held 
sufficient to authorize an attack upon the 
authority of the execution of a written in-
strument, or to assail the corporate capacity 
of plaintiff, or any of the other matters 
enumerated in the statute, then no one could 
tell in advance what the contested issues 
will be, and the plaintiff in every action 
must be prepared to sustain all of them, 
when perhaps none will be assailed at the 
trial. Indeed, such a practice must neces-
sarily result in insisting upon the denial if 
the plaintiff is not prepared but, if he is 
prepared, to waive it. 
While the record in this case in some re-
spects is fragmentary and incomplete, it no 
doubt is so largely because of the fact that 
the defendant at no time presented or sug-
gested any defense to the instrument sued 
on, and thus both the plaintiff and the court 
were somewhat careless in making a com-
plete record. 
The defendant, however, also insists that 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain the 
judgment for the $4.77 protest fees allowed 
by the district court; moreover, that there 
is error in the judgment for costs. The 
plaintiff concedes that, in view that it fail-
ed to prove the protest fees, and that a cost 
bill was not served and filed within the time 
required by our statute, both of those items 
should be omitted, and that it voluntarily 
remits the foregoing items from the judg-
ment. 
The judgment is therefore modified by 
eliminating therefrom the item of $4.77 as 
protest fees, and further by eliminating the 
amount allowed as costs, and, as so modified, 
the judgment is affirmed, with costs, on ap-
peal to plaintiff. 
GIDEON, C. J., CHERRY, J„ and 
CHRISTENSEN, District Judge, concur. 
The term of office of Hon. A. J. WEBER, 
who was Chief Justice, expired before dispo-
sition of this case. 
THURMAN, J., being disqualified, did not 
participate herein. 
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CALIFORNIA PINE BOX DISTRIBUTORS, 
Respondent, v. BURTON LUMBER CO., 
Appellant. (No. 4107.) 
(Supreme Court of Utah. May 11, 1925.) 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake 
County; Ephraim Hanson, Judge. 
Ball, Musser & Robertson, of Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
Irvine, Skeen & Thurman, of Salt Lake 
City, for respondent. 
FRICK, J. This action Is based upon a 
trade acceptance in all respects similar to 
the one involved in the case of Gray's Har-
bor Lumber Company v. Burton Lumber Co., 
236 P. 1102, just decided. The record is in 
the same condition as was the record in that 
case, and the questions presented for review 
are the same, except that in this case no 
protest fees were allowed. 
For the reasons stated in the case just 
referred to, the judgment in this case is 
modified by eliminating therefrom the 
amount allowed as court costs, and, as so 
modified, the judgment is affirmed with 
costs, on appeal to plaintiff. 
GIDEON, C. J., CHERRY, J., and 
CHRISTENSEN, District Judge, concur. 
The term of office of Hon. A. J. WEBER, 
who was Chief Justice, expired before dispo-
sition of this case. 
THURMAN, J., being disqualified, did not 
participate herein. 
PARKER v. WEBER COUNTY IRR. DIST. 
(No. 4142.) 
(Supreme Court of Utah. May 23, 1925.) 
1. Master and servant <§=»68—Engineer's right 
to payment held not dependent on actual ren-
dition of services. 
Engineer's right to payment under con-
tract of employment with irrigation district, 
terminable at any time, held not dependent on 
his performance of any services, but only on 
contract remaining effective and manner pro-
vided therein. 
2. Evidence €=^444(2)—Exclusion of evidence, 
showing Irrigation district's notice to engi-
neer rendering contract of employment effec-
tive had been given on condition which was 
never fulfilled, held error. 
In action against drainage district for com-
pensation due engineer under contract of em-
ployment, which plaintiff alleged became ef-
fective on notice given by district, it was er-
ror to exclude evidence adduced by district 
to show that notice was given on condition 
which was never fulfilled and so understood 
and accepted by plaintiff. 
COUNTy i:ot. LIST. i ios 
P.) 
3. Contracts €=>42—Written instrument deliv-
ered on condition does not become effective 
until happening of contingency provided for. 
Where written instrument, regardless of 
nature, is delivered on express agreement that 
it shall not become effective except on happen-
ing of certain contingency, it does not become 
effective until that event occurs. 
4. Evidence $=>444(2)~That written instru-
ment was delivered on condition that it should 
not become effective until happening of certain 
contingency may be shown by parol. 
That written instrument was delivered on 
condition that it should not become effective 
until happening of certain contingency may be 
shown by parol.1 
5. Contracts <§=>238(2)—Evidence <§=>445(l)— 
Written instrument may be modified by parol 
agreement; parol modifying agreement may 
be established by parol evidence. 
Duly executed written agreement may be 
modified by subsequent oral agreement made 
same day, parol proof of which is admissible, 
and in action against irrigation district for 
payments due engineer under written contract 
of employment parol proof of oral agreement 
modifying written contract sued on was im-
properly excluded. 
6. Appeal and error ®=>837(12)—Improperly 
excluded evidence cannot be examined except 
to determine its admissibility, unless parties 
so stipulate. 
On appeal, improperly excluded evidence 
can only be examined for purpose of determin-
ing its admissibility, and cannot be considered 
by court, except parties stipulate to its cor-
rectness and authorize its consideration. 
Appeal from District Court, Weber Coun-
ty ; J. N. Kimball, Judge. 
Action by A. F. Parker against the Weber 
County Irrigation District, wherein Wynne 
M. Parker, administrator of the estate of A. 
F. Parker, was substituted as party plain-
tiff. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff 
appeals. Reversed and remanded, with di-
rections. 
Pratt & Pratt, of Ogden, for appellant. 
A. G. Horn, of Ogden, for respondent. 
FRICK, J. A. F. Parker commenced this 
action in the district court of Weber county 
against the defendant Weber county irriga-
tion district to recover for services pursuant 
to the terms of a certain contract of employ-
ment entered into between him and said dis-
trict. After the action was commenced and 
pending, Parker died, and his son, the plain-
tiff named in the caption, was substituted, as 
administrator of the estate of the deceased. 
In the complaint, after stating the neces-
sary jurisdictional facts and matters of in-
ducement, it is in substance alleged that on 
the 16th day of December, 1920, the deceased 
entered into a contract with said district, by 
the terms of which he was to perform cer-
$rs>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER In all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 
236 P.—70 * Central Bank v. Stephens, 58 Utah, 858, 199 P.1018. 
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It is undisputed that the conduct of counsel 
in a criminal case may be such as to den\ 
the defendant the fair trial contemplated by 
the due process clauses of both the State 
and Federal Constitutions. People v. De 
Simone, 9 I11.2d 522, 524, 138 N.E.2d 556 
(1956). However, our courts have repeat-
edly held that where the defendant is rep-
resented by counsel of his own choice, the 
judgment of conviction will not be revers-
ed merely because his counsel failed to ex-
ercise the greatest of skill or for the reason 
that it might appear in looking back over 
the trial that he made some tactical blunder. 
In order to vitiate the trial, the whole of the 
representation must be of such low caliber 
as to amount to no representation and re-
duce the trial to a farce. People v. Ste-
phens, 6 I11.2d 257, 259, 260, 128 N.E.2d 
731 (1955); People v. Morris, 3 U1.2d 
437, 443, 448, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954). De-
fendant here was represented by counsel 
of his own choice and the record indicated 
that counsel creditably conducted the de-
fense against insurmountable factual odds. 
[29] The defendant also argues that the 
imposition by the court of an imprison-
ment term of from not less than one year 
and six months to not more than two 
years, upon the revocation of the probation, 
was excessive. The sentence was within 
the maximum penalty for the offense of 
which the defendant had been convicted. 
(111. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 38, section 117-3 
(d) ; and ch. llli/S, par. 441.) We recog-
nize that this court may reduce the punish-
ment imposed by the trial court if the cir-
cumstances warrant such reduction. 111. 
Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, section 121-9 (b) (4). 
[30,31] The power to reduce a sentence 
is one that is to be exercised with caution. 
The imposition of sentence is peculiarly 
within the discretion of the trial court. 
This discretion should not be interfered 
with unless clearly abused. People v. Ste-
vens, 68 Ill.App.2d 265, 273, 215 N.E.2d 
147 (2nd Dist. 1966); People v. Burks, 
NUpp., 215 N.E.2d 144 (2nd Dist. 1966); 
People v. Brown, 60 Ill.App.2d 447, 450, 
208 N.E.2d 629 (1st Dist. 1965); People v. 
Hobbs, 56 Ill.App.2d 93, 98, 99, 205 X.E.2d 
503 (1st Dist. 1965). 
[32] Prior to imposing sentence, the 
trial court stated, among other things, that 
it appeared from the evidence that the de-
fendant had made a mockerv of its proba-
tion order; and that the defendant's testi-
mony at the revocation hearing was fan-
tastic and beyond belief. Under the cir-
cumstances of this case, we find no abuse 
of discretion in imposing sentence, and, 
accordingly, the judgment must be affirm-
ed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
THOMAS J .MORAN, P. J., and ABRA-
HAMSON, J., concur. 
O I MY MUMBIR SYSTEM 
In the Matter of the ESTATE of Bessie 
BICKFORD, Deceased, Peti-
tioner-Appellee, 
v. 
Vern L. BICKFORD, Jr., Respondent-
Appellant. 
Gen. No. 66-6. 
Appellate Court of Illinois. 
Third District. 
Aug. 5, 1966. 
Action by administratrix to recover as-
sets from intestate's son. The Circuit 
Court, Rock Island County, Probate Divi-
sion, Forest Dizotell, J., rendered judgment 
for administratrix and son appealed. The 
Appellate Court, Stouder, J., held that evi-
dence made prima facie case that assets 
consisting of money, tractor, and space 
heater were owned by intestate at time of 
her death and that son failed to carry 
burden of proving change of possession or 
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control or any other circumstance from 
which change of ownership could be in-
ferred 
Affirmed 
1. Executors and Administrators <§=*59 
Burden of proof in citation proceeding 
to recover estate assets is on petitioner until 
petitioner has presented prima facie case of 
ownership by decedent, at which time bur-
den of establishing ownership shifts to per-
son claiming the assets. 
2. Executors and Administrators <S=>59 
Evidence that money sought to be re-
covered by administratrix in citation pro-
ceedings was in pocket of dress owned by 
intestate and in her control until time of her 
removal to hospital presented prima facie 
case of ownership of such money by in-
testate. 
3. Executors and Administrators <§=*59 
Where evidence presented prima facie 
case of ownership of assets by intestate at 
time of death, evidence that intestate short-
ly before death had stated that contested 
assets belonged to son and son's uncor-
roborated testimony that he had received 
assets as gift did not establish son's own-
ership, in absence of change of possession 
or control, delivery either actual or con-
structive or any other circumstance from 
which change of ownership could be in-
ferred. 
Stewart R. Winstein, Rock Island, for 
appellant. 
Long, Gende & Schrager, E. Moline, for 
appellee. 
STOUDER, Justice. 
Petitioner Appellee, Bessie A. Winger, 
Administratrix of the estate of Bessie Bick-
ford, commenced this action as a part of 
the probate proceedings pending in the Cir-
cuit Court of Rock Island County, by 
filing her petition for citation against Vern 
L. Bickford, Jr., Respondent, Appellant, to 
recover assets belonging to the estate of the 
deceased. This is an appeal from an order 
of the court finding that $2,507.00, a tractor 
and a space heater belonged to the de-
cedent at the date of her decease and order-
ing Respondent to turn over the property to 
the Petitioner, Administratrix. 
Bessie Bickford died intestate on August 
14, 1964, a resident of Rock Island County, 
Illinois. Letters of Administration were 
duly issued by the Circuit Court of Rock 
Island County to Bessie A. Winger, a 
daughter, Petitioner herein. Decedent left 
as her heirs at law, several children includ-
ing Petitioner and Respondent. Citation 
proceedings were instituted by Petitioner to 
recover a tractor, space heater and $2,507.00 
in possession of Respondent, alleged to be-
long to decedent and hence considered part 
of the estate. 
The evidence presented consisted pri-
marily of the testimony of Petitioner, Re-
spondent, other children of decedent and the 
former wife of Respondent. The evidence 
is undisputed that the decedent, Bessie 
Bickford, owned the house in which she 
lived and that Respondent had lived with 
her for most of his life including the period 
of his marriage. The decedent operated A, 
restaurant for twelve years prior to h#r 
death. Decedent had been in ill health for 
approximately three years being hospital-
ized for three months prior to her dealfc 
After her death $2,507.00 was discovered #1 
the pocket of her dress located in a stQttfij 
room of her house. Decedent also kept hft 
receipts and other business papers in w 
same storeroom in^ which the dress was kejC 
Respondent took possession of and cotmtro 
the money in the presence of the othlK 
children after the decease of Bessie B i « | 
ford, the testimony being conflicting a s j | | 
statements allegedly made by Respondent^ 
the time. Although denied by R e s p o n d ^ 
other witnesses testified that he s t a t e d « | 
money was his mother's. The e v i d e n c e J | | 
also conflicting concerning the posstijS 
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sources of the money, Respondent in his 
testimony claimed that he had received gifts 
from his father and grandfather some years 
earlier and that he had delivered the money 
to his mother for safekeeping. Respondent 
also testified that he had helped his mother 
in the restaurant and that the restaurant 
had been unprofitable for some time prior 
to his mother's death. Other testimony in-
dicated that Respondent had not been em-
ployed regularly for more than eight years 
and that he had no money which he could 
ha\e gnen his mother. It also appears 
rom the testimony that three da>s before 
her death the decedent had made a state-
ment in the hospital in the presence of her 
children to the effect that the money in the 
dress was Respondent's. So far as the 
tractor and space heater are concerned Re-
spondent claimed that his mother had given 
them to him approximately four years prior 
to her death. 
[1] Respondent, in seeking a reversal of 
the order of the trial court, argues that the 
order is against the manifest weight of the 
t\ idence. The primary area of controversy 
appears to be whether Petitioner or Re-
spondent has the burden of proof. Re-
spondent argues that the burden of proof in 
a citation proceeding is on Petitioner. Peti-
tioner does not dispute this but contends 
that where Respondent does not obtain pos-
scssion of property until after the death of 
'lccedent, he has the burden of showing 
ownership m himself. We believe there is 
merit in both arguments but that such argu-
ments are not inconsistent, finding support 
as they do in the same Illinois authorities. 
The burden of persuasion remains with 
Petitioner but when Petitioner has present-
c<3 a prima facie case of ownership by the 
decedent the burden of establishing own-
ership in himself shifts to Respondent. 
Vercillo v. Gagliardi, 27 Ill.App.2d 151, 169 
-VE.2d 364. To the same effect are, In re 
H!
«'s Estate, 42 Ill.App.2d 396, 192 N.E.2d 
4 2 9
 and Storr v. Storr, 329 Ill.App. 537, 69 
* E.2d 916 where the decedent had trans-
crred possession of the disputed asset prior 
his death and ownership of such asset 
219 N E 2d—11 
was claimed by donee as an inter vivos gift. 
In the aforementioned cases the court con-
cluded that the prima facie case of owner-
ship had been presented by Petitioner there-
by requiring Respondent donee to establish 
the inter vivos gift to him by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
[2,3] It is in the application of these 
rules and in their differing views of the 
evidence that the parties disagree. Re-
spondent contends that possession of the 
money involved was not obtained after the 
death of his mother but was ahva>s with 
Respondent. Therefore Petitioner has 
failed to sustain her initial burden of prov-
ing ownership of the money by decedent. 
We cannot agree with Respondent's anal-
ysis of the facts as shown by the evidence. 
The evidence shows clearly that the money 
involved was in the pocket of a dress owned 
by decedent and in her control until the time 
of her removal to the hospital. There is no 
evidence showing any change in control at 
that time or from that time to the date of 
death. In our opinion, this establishes the 
element of possession in decedent at the 
time of death rather than in Respondent 
and when considered with the other evi-
dence amply presents a prima facie case of 
ownership of such money by decedent. 
This being the case, the burden was on Re-
spondent to show by what right he claimed 
ownership. The facts which Respondent 
claims support his ownership of the money 
are disputed in practically every material 
respect. Even the statement of decedent 
shortly before her death that the money 
belonged to Respondent can be interpreted 
as a desire of the decedent that Respondent 
have such money after her death particu-
larly when viewed in relation to other 
testimony suggesting that Respondent ex-
pected special treatment in the disposition 
of the decedent's estate. The trial court's 
determination of facts adverse to the claim 
of Respondent finds ample support in the 
conflicting evidence and such determination 
will not be disturbed on review. 
As to the other items of personal proper-
ty claimed to be gifts to Respondent by de-
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cedent, again, we have only Respondent's 
assertion that they were gifts. The evi-
dence discloses no change of possession or 
control, no delivery either actual or con-
structive nor any other altered circum-
stance from which a change of ownership 
can be inferred. 
The authorities relied upon by Respond-
ent all involve factual situations where ac-
tual possession of the property involved was 
clearly in Respondent at the time of death 
and have no application to the point at issue 
in the instant case. We are here dealing 
with the question of possession. Since we 
find possession to have been in decedent 
we must further find that Respondent did 
not meet his burden of proving ownership 
in himself and the decision of the lower 
court must be affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
CORYN, P. J., and ALLOY, J., concur. 
73 Ill.App.2d 369 
Bobby Ray CLARK and Warren H. Jordan, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
William B. FIELDS, Defendant-Appellee. 
Gen. No. 65-74. 
Appellate Court of Illinois. 
Fifth District. 
July 22, 1966. 
Action against bailee of airplane which 
was destroyed in fire which occurred in 
back yard of bailee's home. The Circuit 
Court, St. Clair County, Harold 0 . Farmer, 
J., rendered judgment for bailee and bailors 
appealed. The Appellate Court, Eberspach-
er, J., held that where bailee set fire to 
trash in open gulley which was filled with 
dr> grass and which was only 15 or 20 
feet from airplane, and then returned to 
his house while fire was smouldering and 
airplane was destroyed, evidence did not 
rebut bailors' prima facie case of bailee's 
negligence in that they had delivered plane 
to bailee who could not return it upon 
demand. 
Reversed and remanded with direc-
tions. 
Goldenhersh, P. J., dissented. 
1. Bailment <§=>I2 
Gratuitous bailee is bound to take 
such care in preservation of property in-
trusted to him as every prudent man takes 
of his own goods of like character. 
2. Bailment <S=*3I(I) 
Burden of proceeding as to issue 6L 
negligence shifts to bailee after bailor has] 
shown that goods were received in good] 
condition by bailee and not returned 4&1 
bailor on demand. 
3. Appeal and Error <§=>I003 
Reviewing court has duty to reversfe] 
where verdict is clearly against manife$y 
weight of evidence. 
4. Bailment <©=>! I 
Where bailee set fire to trash in op<SjSI 
gulley which was filled with dry grass any 
which was only 15 or 20 feet from aigl 
plane, and returned to his house while fira 
was smouldering and airplane was d e s t r ( jH| 
ed, bailee did not use ordinary care ajjjfl 
was liable for the loss. 
Kassly, Weihl, Carr & Bone, East 
Louis, for appellants, Rex Carr, East 
Louis, of counsel. 
Johnson, Ducey & Feder, Belleville, 
appellee. 
EBERSPACHER, Justice. 
